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Tort Reform is Part of the Problem,
Federalized Protection for Peer
Review Needs to be Part of the
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INTRODUCTION
Peer review and medical malpractice litigation ostensibly
coexist in the United States body of law affecting health care to
achieve many of the same social goals; the goals in common
include the improvement of health care quality by establishment
of best practices and reduction of medical error. 1 The current
health care debate has focused, however, on the degree to which
the tort system adds substantial transactional costs (attorneys
fees and insurance premiums) and clinical costs (so-called
defensive medicine, both the over use of testing and aggressive
procedures, and the avoidance of complex cases to avoid
vulnerability to litigation),2 while its affirmative impact on quality
* B.A. Wellesley College (1973); J.D. Georgetown University (1978); Partner,
Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge L.L.P.
* A.B. Brown University (1983); J.D. University of Pennsylvania (1988);
Counsel, Edwards Angell Palmer & Dodge L.L.P.
1. See, e.g., Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Health
Care Reform, 155 CONG. REc. H9391 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 2009).
2. See Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and
Damage Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment
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is questionable. 3
By contrast, peer review marshals the resources of health care
providers to engage in a targeted analysis of quality without the
costs for which the tort system has been justly criticized. The
problem is that peer review and medical malpractice litigation are
in tension with each other in that medical malpractice litigation
feeds off candid criticism of care by converting peer review into a
tool to achieve higher verdicts and settlements in individual cases.
Since the stifling effect of medical malpractice litigation on
aggressive and effective peer review to improve patient care was
first identified, one by one, states have adopted some level of
protection in an attempt to create a balance. The result is a
confusing hodgepodge that varies among states. This lack of
uniformity is increasingly deleterious for efficacious peer review in
a health care system where the parochialism of the past needs to
give way to regional and national standards of excellence.
This Article proposes that the relationship between peer
review and medical malpractice should be reset to give
preeminence to the former, at least with respect to immunity,
confidentiality, and privilege. The vehicle to do so already exists -
the Patient Safety Quality Improvement Act ("PSQIA") - and the
mechanism is simple. Congress should revisit the PSQIA and
create a federal peer review privilege that unambiguously and
effectively removes the entire peer review process from the threat
of the tort system by expanding the definition of "patient safety
work product" to avoid the loophole otherwise created by the pre-
to Improve Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 530
(2004).
3. Others disagree. Professor Issacharoff views "tort reform" as part of
a broader attack on "ex post accountability" generally. Samuel Issacharoff,
Regulating after the Fact, 56 DEPAuL L. REv. 375, 385-86 (2007). Rather than
facilitating the exchange of information, peer review in particular
perpetuates a "conspiracy of silence." B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review
Privilege: A Law in Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 160
(1984). See, e.g., Maynard v. United States, 133 F.R.D. 107, 108 (D.N.J.
1990) (burden was on plaintiff to overcome decision by colonel at military
hospital that documents were privileged quality assurance documents);
Columbia/JFK Med. Ctr. Ltd. P'ship v. Sanguonchitte, 920 So. 2d 711, 712
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (documents in physician's credentialing file were
protected from discovery in patient's action against hospital for negligent
credentialing); Alexander v. Super. Ct., 23 Cal. Rptr. 2d 397, 403 (Cal. 1993)
(same).
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emption clause in the PSQIA.
Part I of this Article adumbrates what peer review means in
the state and federal courts, and why it has value. In particular,
it focuses on the importance of immunity, confidentiality and
privilege to peer review. Part II of this Article addresses the
status of the peer review privilege in Rhode Island and its
relationship to Rule 407 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence.
Part III of this Article explicates the PSQIA and points out the
flaw in the Act that excludes certain peer review materialS4 from
its coverage. Part IV of this Article explains why the PSQIA does
not pre-empt state laws mandating the provision of peer review
materials to state regulators, leaving those materials outside the
protection of the PSQIA. Finally, Part V of this Article presents a
proposal to improve health care by amending the PSQIA to
expressly preempt state law that fails to protect peer review
materials.
I. WHAT IS PEER REVIEW?
"Errors have always been a part of . . . medic[ine] . ."5
Historically, errors have been addressed through the tort system,
which "encourages good decision making, compensates persons
4. This Article intentionally uses the generic term "peer review
materials" to describe documents that are somehow associated with the peer
review process. See Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 891 F. Supp. 607, 611
(N.D. Ga. 1995) ("[T]here are two kinds of privileged information covered by
[the peer review] statute: (1) material that relates directly to the peer review
investigation, which is always nondiscoverable, despite its source; and (2)
information that would have existed regardless of the institution's
investigation, but is sought from the peer review body itself."). It is beyond
the scope of and not necessary to this Article to parse each state's law to
identify exactly which documents are covered, which are not, and whether
their dissemination can be limited by other legal doctrines such as the
remedial action privilege (FED. R. EVID. 407), the attorney-client privilege, or
the work-product doctrine. For a discussion of the application of these other
legal doctrines to peer review materials, see, for example, Cynthia J. Dollar,
Promoting Better Health Care: Policy Arguments for Concurrent Quality
Assurance and Attorney-Client Hospital Incident Report Privileges, 3 HEALTH
MATRIX 259, 273-87 (1993).
5. Marshall B. Kapp, Medical Error Versus Malpractice, 1 DEPAUL J.
HEALTH CARE L. 751, 751 (1997) (citing CHARLES L. BoSK, FORGIVE AND
REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE (1979)); see also David A. Hyman &
Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the U.S.: Is
Malpractice Liability Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 90 CORNELL
L. REv. 893, 948 (2005) (human frailties make some errors inevitable).
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who have been wrongfully harmed, promotes social dialogue on
questions of . . . treatment, and serves to guide the conduct of
third parties."6
The tort system, however, should be the "regulator of last
resort."7 Given the potentially drastic economic, reputational and
psychological impact of an adverse litigation outcome, the tort
system creates a perverse incentive for health care providers to
hide mistakes and "near-misses" as opposed to learning from
them.8  The analysis of "near-misses" is particularly crucial
because they afford health care providers the opportunity "to
identify and remedy vulnerabilities in systems before the
occurrence of harm."9 Rather than acknowledge error, health care
providers may pretend that incidents never occurred, or even
worse, cover them up.10 As a result, valuable data about misses
and near-misses is irretrievably lost to the detriment of both
physicians and their patients, and the fiduciary relationship
between physician and patient is violated.11
6. Robin Fretwell Wilson, Hospital Ethics Committees as the Forum of
Last Resort: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 76 N.C. L. REV. 353, 394
(1998); see also P.T. v. Richard Hall Cmty. Mental Health Care Ctr., 837 A.2d
436, 445 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2002) ("duties of care owed by
professionals to their patients . . . are important duties for they safeguard all
of us from excesses at the hands of professionals"); Hyman & Silver, supra
note 5, at 947-48 (malpractice system prompted the informed consent
doctrine and improved health care generally).
7. Michelle M. Mello, Carly N. Kelly & Troyen A. Brennan, Fostering
Rational Regulation of Patient Safety, 30 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 375, 418
(2005).
8. Bryan A. Liang & Steven D. Small, Communicating About Care:
Addressing Federal-State Issues in Peer Review and Mediation to Promote
Patient Safety, 3 Hous. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 219, 220-21, 223 (2003).
9. Institute of Med., To ERR Is HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM 87 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000); see also Bryan A. Liang, The
Adverse Event of Unaddressed Medical Error: Identifying and Filling the
Holes in the Health-Care and Legal Systems, 29 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 346, 357-
58 (2001); Paul Barach & Steven D. Small, How the NHS Can Improve Safety
and Learning: By Learning Free Lessons from Near Misses, 320 BRIT. MED. J.
1683, 1684 (2000).
10. Kapp, supra note 5, at 757; Liang & Small, supra note 8, at 221. But
see Bryan A. Liang, John Bramhall & Bruce Cullen, Which Syringe Did I
Use? Anesthesiologist Confusion and Potential Liability for a Medical Error,
14 J. OF CLINIcAL ANESTHESIA 371 (2002) (describing a case of potential
medical error in which the erring physician "fessed up" to the patient; the
patient subsequently sued).
11. Kapp, supra note 5, at 758-59; see also Thomas L. Hafemeister &
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Peer review, by contrast, generally seeks to accomplish the
same goals, other than compensation. It is a process by which
health care providers evaluate their colleagues' work to determine
if it complied with the standard of care by understanding the root
cause of why a preventable adverse event occurred. 12 Peer review
can also apply to the credentialing process. 13 Peer review is based
on three premises: (1) only health care providers can effectively
evaluate each other from a clinical perspective; (2) to do so,
participants in peer review processes must engage in candid
communication; and (3) participants act in good faith. 14
Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician's Fiduciary Duty to Disclose an
Emergent Medical Risk to the Patient, 86 WASH. U.L. REV. 1167, 1194-95
(2009) (proposing a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to
disclose a material emergent medical risk to a patient).
12. George E. Newton, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social
and Judicial Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723,
723 (2001); Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of
State and Federal Peer Review Laws for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541,
541-42 (2003).
13. See Craig W. Dallon, Understanding Judicial Review of Hospitals'
Credentialing and Peer Review Decisions, 73 TEMP. L. REV. 597, 610-12 (2000)
(discussing new applications for privileges, renewals of existing privileges,
and review of problems). See, e.g., United States ex rel. Roberts v. QHG of
Ind., Inc., No. 1:97-CV-174, 1998 WL 1756728, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8,
1998); Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Minn. 2007); Pastore v.
Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1074-76 (R.I. 2006); St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v.
Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tex. 1997); see also Humana Hosp. Desert
Valley v. Super. Ct., 742 P.2d 1382, 1388 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting
argument that peer review only refers to retrospective review of patient care
and not credentialing).
14. Ilene N. Moore, James W. Pichert, Gerald B. Hickson, Charles
Federspiel & Jennifer U. Blackford, Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and
Addressing Medical Malpractice Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177
(2006); see also Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 633 (3d Cir.
1996) (there is a strong presumption that peer review is conducted in good
faith); LeMasters v. Christ Hosp., 791 F. Supp. 188, 191 (S.D. Ohio 1991)
("[M]ost physicians feel an ethical duty to the profession and to the public to
keep the standard of health care high."); Young v. Western Pa. Hosp., 722
A.2d 153, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) ('[B]ecause of the expertise and level of
skill required in the practice of medicine, the medical profession itself is in
the best position to police its own activities."' (quoting Cooper v. Delaware
Valley Med. Ctr., 630 A.2d 1, 14 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), aff'd, 654 A.2d 547
(Pa. 1995))). But see Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 98 n.3, 101-06 (1988)
(peer review in that case was '"shabby, unprincipled and unprofessional"');
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 128 n.4 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (questioning whether one doctor will tell a patient that another
doctor "failed to live up to minimum standards of medical proficiency").
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Medical systems are complex, and in a complex system even a
99.9% level of proficiency may not be adequate.15 The purpose of
peer review is to "improve hospital conditions and patient care or
to reduce the rates of death and disease."16 As Judge Lipez of the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has noted,
"[i]f patients are being subjected to unnecessary procedures and
tests, the consequences are both economic and medical."17
The impact of peer review on medical care is direct: "Hospitals
gain a lot of valuable information by evaluating the safety of new
brain surgery techniques, the appropriateness of certain types of
patient restraints, whether nursing rounds are being performed
frequently enough to monitor the patients sufficiently, causes of a
patient's death, or the circumstances surrounding the birth of an
infant with cerebral palsy."18 When hospital conditions and
patient care improve and the rates of death and disease decline,
the number of medical malpractice lawsuits should decline.19
Peer review thus seeks to identify and eliminate these systemic
"accidents waiting to happen," thereby maximizing efficient health
care outcomes.20
A key variable in the success of peer review is the
15. Lucian L. Leape, Error in Medicine, 272 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1851, 1851
(1990). Professor Reason has analogized error systems to Swiss cheese; the
holes are potential failures, and the solid areas represent defenses. An error
can pass through the system when the holes line up. James Reason, Human
Error: Models and Management, 320 BRIT. MED. J. 768, 769 (2004).
16. Niven v. Siqueira, 487 N.E.2d 937, 942 (Ill. 1985); see also Logue v.
Velez, 699 N.E.2d 365, 367 (N.Y. 1998). But see Ehlen v. St. Cloud Hosp., No.
C4-96-632, 1996 WL 589042, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2006) (denying
peer review protection to discussion of a rule that would affect all urologists
at a hospital as opposed to single urologist challenging credentialing
decision).
17. Singh v. BlueCross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 39 (1st
Cir. 2002).
18. Dollar, supra note 4, at 298; see, e.g., Mathews v. Lancaster Gen.
Hosp., 87 F.3d 624, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1996) (granting immunity where plaintiff
physician injured patient with high speed drill); Unnamed Physician v. Bd. of
Trustees of St. Agnes Med. Ctr., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 309, 321 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001) (privileging dispute involving physician whose infection rate was
quadruple the national average of his peers); Lo v. Provena Covenant Med.
Ctr., 796 N.E.2d 607, 611, 617 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (upholding hospital's
decision to suspend privileges of doctor whose mortality rate was almost
double the national average).
19. See Pastore, 900 A.2d at 1079.
20. See Liang & Ren, supra note 2, at 523.
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receptiveness of team leaders to discussing mistakes. 21 When
properly done, peer review incorporates continuous quality
improvement and "focuses on the cause of adverse events from a
'systems' perspective and asks about the context or conditions that
led to the error."22 Rather than individualizing blame as the tort
system does, peer review encourages learning and safety
enhancements. 23  By looking at problems from a "systems"
perspective, peer review can then address what might otherwise
seem to be isolated incidents occurring one at a time-"'an injury
here, a mistake there, an accident here, a death here."' 24 These
"[1]atent failures often go unrecognized and remain within the
system, 'increasing the potential for adverse events in the future
because they predispose the system to failure."' 25 Even when
these failures can be identified, "shame and blame" mechanisms
push these problems underground. 26
Peer review has not, however, been without its critics. In the
past, commentators have argued on the basis of empirical analysis
that peer review does not work. 27  Their conclusion is not
surprising; badly done peer review that merely focuses on "[r]aw
21. See Amy C. Edmondson, Learning from Mistakes Is Easier Said Than
Done: Group and Organizational Influences on the Detection and Correction of
Human Error, 40 J. APPLIED BEHAVIORAL Scl. 66, 70 (2004).
22. Melissa Chiang, Promoting Patient Safety: Creating a Workable
Reporting System, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 383, 388 (2001).
23. Leape, supra note 15, at 1851; Liang & Small, supra note 8, at 220;
Oliver Quick, Outing Medical Errors: Questions of Trust and Responsibility,
14 MED. L. REV. 22, 39 (2006).
24. Quick, supra note 23, at 27. Plaintiffs counsel can also connect the
dots. Jason M. Healy, William M. Altman & Thomas C. Fox, Confidentiality
of Health Care Provider Quality of Care Information, 40 BRANDEIs L.J. 595,
618 (2002) (plaintiffs attorney will often use the discovery phase to turn a
single incident into a pattern of neglect).
25. Liang & Small, supra note 8, at 223.
26. Liang & Ren, supra note 2, at 524.
27. See, e.g., Susan 0. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost
But No Benefit-Is It Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8-9 (1999)
(data from the National Practitioner Data Bank "suggests that peer review
protection statutes do not encourage peer review"); Gregory G. Gosfield,
Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q.
552, 575 (1979) ("[E]ven if peer review activity is increased, it is unclear
whether the result will be lower cost and higher quality of health care."). But
see Chiang, supra note 22, at 388-89 n.28 (discussing how continuous quality
improvement in the delivery of anesthesia has dramatically reduced
mortality rates).
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percentages" obviously create "incentives for physicians to
abandon high risk patients."28 As peer review has become more
sophisticated, however, it has become more effective.
Critics have also argued that peer review potentially muffles
the "deterren[t] signal" that litigation generates. 29 According to
these fault finders, only the "specter of stiff recoveries and
increased insurance premiums," not analyses of systems, will force
health care providers to address medical errors.30 According to
them, a focus on systems should not become a substitute for
individual professional responsibility. Cases should not be
allowed to "'dribble away into a general amalgam of agents and
conditions, reactions and counter-reactions, which brings social
certainty and popularity to the concept of system."'31
An additional criticism that has enjoyed some popularity in
the past is that the peer review privilege protects health care
28. Harris v. Bellin Mem'l Hosp., 13 F.3d 1082, 1090 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Flaum, J., concurring).
29. Wilson, supra note 6, at 395.
30. Joan Vogel & Richard Delgado, To Tell the Truth: Physicians'Duty to
Disclose Medical Mistakes, 28 UCLA L. REV. 52, 56 (1980-1981).
31. Quick, supra note 23, at 42 (quoting Ulrich Beck, RISK SOCIETY:
TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 33 (1992)); see also Michael R. Flick, The Due
Process of Dying, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1165 (1991) ("Doctors must be held
accountable for their personal involvement in healing . .. . Cementing the
locus of medical decision-making power in any party . . . [allows] the people
involved to assign responsibility for their actions to someone else."); Michael
J. Trebilcock, Incentive Issues in the Design of "No Fault" Compensation
Systems, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 19, 53 (1989) (idea that accidents should be a
community responsibility ignores the fact that accident rates are influenced
by individuals who respond to economic incentives); Hyman & Silver, supra
note 5, at 916-17 (liability rules make physicians more careful). But see
Bryan A. Liang, Assessing Medical Malpractice Jury Verdicts: A Case Study
of an Anesthesiology Department, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 121, 145-47
(1997) (physicians do not understand the jury system and, consequently, its
deterrent effect is misplaced). The ultimate example of systems analysis
subsuming common sense was the statement of a British judge to a surgeon
convicted of manslaughter:
It was not your fault that you were allowed to go on operating,
subject to restrictions, for another two years. Much of the evidence
of these events was known at the time and the balance of the
evidence was easily discoverable had it occurred to anyone making
elementary inquiries.
Quick, supra note 23, at 42 (quoting Hospital Did Not Stop Killer Surgeon,
THE TIMES 21 (June 24, 2004)).
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providers, not patients.32  Seen in this light, peer review is
another device by which health care providers maintain control
over health care delivery. Statutes like the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act ("HCQIA") are nothing more than "special
interest legislation developed by effective lobbying efforts of
medical and hospital lobby groups to protect their members." 33
Peer review is also inconsistent with the "de-expertification" of
health care, whether through increased lay control of medical
decisions by way of managed care, 34 or greater public
participation on medical licensing boards. 35
Yet another concern is that peer review, like any privilege,
lends itself to abuse on the part of the entity claiming it.36 Just as
the defense bars summons up the damages arising from the hot
cup of coffee, the plaintiffs' bar points to the invocation of the peer
review privilege to shield the production of an incident report
involving a collapsed chair in a clinic waiting room. 37 The fact
that specious assertions of privileges like this one have failed
shows that specious claims are the exception that prove the rule.
Finally, critics also see peer review as cultivating
32. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 3, at 151 (quoting SISELLA BOK,
SECRETS 131 (1982)); Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 20; see also Nazareth
Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177, 179 (Ky. 1973)
("Although [a peer review privilege] might be regarded as an initially
appealing argument, on reflection, one might well debate wherein the public
interest lies.").
33. Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 19.
34. Lu Ann Trevifio, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act: Sword or
Shield?, 22 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 315, 317 (1997) (Congress lets doctors use
peer review to "circle the wagons" against public scrutiny); cf. Adam M.
Freiman, The Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of Medicine
Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of Efficiency into the Modern Health Care
Environment, 47 EMoRY L.J. 697, 743-46 (1998) (reviewing the impact of
increased lay control of medical decisions through managed care).
35. James N. Thompson, The Future of Medical Licensure in the United
States, 81 AcAD. MED. S36, S36 (2006) (citing the work of the Pew Health
Professions Commission).
36. See, e.g., Marte v. Brooklyn Hosp. Ctr., 779 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2004) (hospital sought to use peer review privilege to shield
information about hospital security where patient was assaulted while at the
hospital); Sonsini v. Mem'1 Hosp. for Cancer & Diseases, 693 N.Y.S.2d 17, 18
(N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (maintenance log for mammography machine was not
peer review material).
37. Berggren v. St. Vincent's Catholic Med. Ctr. of N.Y., Inc., 5 Misc. 3d
1028(A), 2004 WL 2903641, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004).
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opportunities for "corrupt and ulterior motives" where doctors
have competing economic interests. 38 Not all peer review has
been for the purpose of improving health care. 39 Perfection should
not, however, become the enemy of good. 40
In fact, not all health care providers are enamored with peer
review. While the greatest deterrent to peer review is the fear of
future litigation by participants,41 peer review also entails
criticizing peers, losing time with patients in order to participate
in the peer review process and a fear of reprisals in the form of
diminished patient referrals even if there is absolutely no
litigation.42  More fundamentally, peer review entails
acknowledging error, and doctors are not supposed to make
mistakes, 43 let alone admit 44 and apologize for them.45
38. See, e.g., Yann H.H. van Geertruyden, The Fox Guarding the
Henhouse: How the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 and State
Peer Review Protection Statutes Have Helped Protect Bad Faith Peer Review
in the Medical Community, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 239, 240 (2001)
(citing Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th
Cir. 1996)).
39. Patrick, 486 U.S. at 98 & n.4; Oltz v. St. Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 861
F.2d 1440, 1451 (9th Cir. 1988); Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 819-20
(3d Cir. 1984).
40. See VOLTAIRE, LA BtGUEULE (1772) ("Le mieux est l'ennemi du bien").
41. H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6384, 6385; see also Ayash v. Dana-Farber Cancer Inst., 822 N.E.2d 667, 691
(Mass. 2005) ("Physicians would be far less willing candidly to report, testify
about, and investigate concerns of patient safety if their actions would be
subject to later scrutiny and possible litigation."); Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d
111, 114-15 (Fla. 1992) ('The privilege afforded to peer review committees is
intended to prohibit the chilling effect of the potential public disclosure of
statements made to or information prepared for and used by the committee in
carrying out its peer review function."); Cal. Eye Inst. v. Super. Ct., 264 Cal.
Rptr. 83, 87 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("Participation in peer review would be
inhibited if a committee member's comments could be discovered in a damage
action against a committee member or others.").
42. Reed E. Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their
Legal Status, 1 AM. J.L. & MED. 245, 254 (1975); Newton, supra note 12, at
729; Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 18.
43. David Hilfiker, Sounding Board: Facing Our Mistakes, 310 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 118, 121 (1984); cf. Carlo Fonseka, To Err Was Fatal, 313 BRIT.
MED. J. 1640, 1640 (1996) ("Error free patient care is the ideal standard but
in reality unattainable."); Robert Levy, Code Blue, 7 HARV. PUB. HEALTH REV.
36, 39 (1995) (discussing the "culture of infallibility"); Kapp, supra note 5, at
756 ("[P]hysicians tend to envision themselves as lifeguards upon whose shift
no one should be allowed to drown.").
44. A growing number of states, however, require hospitals to disclose
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Despite these legitimate concerns, peer review is seen as a
public good. 46 Peer review encourages practices that seek to avoid
preventable adverse events in the first place, thereby reducing
costs. 47 Health care providers can and want to learn from their
errors, and the sooner they learn, the better.48 Health care
providers, therefore, use peer review in a range of settings as an
ex ante means to quickly prevent mistakes from recurring. 49
Congress has recognized the value of peer review, albeit
slowly. Pursuant to its spending power, Congress has mandated
that hospitals must have peer review programs to participate in
Medicare.50  In addition, Congress has afforded peer review
adverse events to patients. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1279.1
(West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0197(4)(d) (West 2006); 40 PA. STAT. ANN.
§ 1303.308(b) (2009).
45. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 233, § 23D (2000) (creating a safe harbor for
apologizers); see also Marlynn Wei, Doctors, Apologies, and the Law: An
Analysis and Critique of Apology Laws, 40 J. HEALTH L. 107, 110-13 (2007)
(reviewing the role of apologies and disclosure in malpractice cases); cf. Lee
Taft, Apology Within a Moral Dialectic: A Reply to Professor Robbennolt, 103
MICH. L. REv. 1010, 1016 (2005) (expressions of sympathy that become rituals
detract from the policies behind apologies). But see David M. Studdert et al.,
Disclosure of Medical Injury to Patients: An Improbable Risk Management
Strategy, 26 HEALTH AFF. 215, 221 (2007) (questioning whether disclosures
reduce litigation).
46. See, e.g., State ex rel. St. Anthony's Med. Ctr. v. Provaznik, 863
S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993); Penland v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., Civ.
A. No. 87-1247, 1987 WL 25668, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 1987); Fox v. Kramer,
82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), aff'd, 994 P.2d 343 (Cal. 2000);
Campbell v. St. Mary's Hosp., 252 N.W.2d 581, 587 (Minn. 1977).
47. See Donald M. Berwick, Sounding Board: Continuous Improvement
as an Ideal in Health Care, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 53, 56 (1989). Another
option is regulation. While regulation is prospective, it lacks flexibility.
48. In 1999, the Institute of Medicine determined that between 44,000
and 98,000 Americans died annually as a result of medical errors in
hospitals. Most of these deaths were the results of system failures that could
be reduced by instituting better procedures. Institute of Med., supra note 9,
at 1, 4-5.
49. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809(a)(7) (West 2003) ("It is the intent
of the Legislature that peer review ... be done ... with an emphasis on early
detection of potential quality problems and resolutions through informal
educational interventions."); cf. Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 260 (R.I.
1996) (describing the tort system as "cumbersome and often lengthy").
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(a) (2008); see also Fischer v. United States, 529
U.S. 666, 672 (2000) ("Peer review organizations monitor providers'
compliance" with the "statutory obligation of providing 'medically necessary'
services 'of a quality which meets professionally recognized standards of
health care.").
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protection for medical programs offered by the Department of
Defense 5 and the Department of Veterans Affairs. 52
In 1986, Congress enacted the HCQIA to afford participants
in peer review activities qualified immunity from liability for
monetary damages brought by physicians who were the subject of
peer review activities, including the Sherman Antitrust Act. 53
The purpose of the HCQIA was "to prevent patient harm, not to
assure an adequate response after it occurred." 54 Enactment of
the HCQIA was a tradeoff; physicians who participated in peer
review activities secured qualified immunity but agreed to the
reporting of adverse actions against physicians to the National
Practitioner Data Bank.55
The HCQIA succeeded in squashing a raft of lawsuits
challenging credentialing decisions as violations of the Sherman
Act, even though the Sherman Act does not preclude the dismissal
of incompetent physicians. 56 Many of these cases were beyond
frivolous, essentially preventing hospitals and other physicians
51. 10 U.S.C. § 1102(a) (2006); see, e.g., In re United States, 864 F.2d
1153, 1156 (5th Cir. 1989) (overturning order compelling production of peer
review records from military hospital); Maynard v. United States, 133 F.R.D.
107, 108 (D.N.J. 1990) (refusing to compel production of documents classified
by hospital as quality assurance documents).
52. 38 U.S.C. § 5705(a) (2006); see, e.g., Utterback v. United States, 121
F.R.D. 297, 299 (W.D. Ky. 1987). But see Bethel v. United States ex. rel.
Veterans Admin. Med. Ctr., 242 F.R.D. 580, 585-86 (D. Colo. 2007) (root
cause analyses not protected by the Veterans Administration's quality
assurance privilege).
53. Pub. L. No. 99-660, Tit. IV, § 402, 100 Stat. 3784 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101 (2006)); see, e.g., Austin v. McNamara, 979
F.2d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 1992); Untracht v. Fikri, 454 F. Supp. 2d 289, 327
(W.D. Pa. 2006), aff'd, 249 Fed. Appx. 268 (3d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.
Ct. 1666 (2008); Rogers v. Columbia/HCA of Cent. La., Inc., 971 F. Supp. 229,
237 (W.D. La. 1997).
54. Singh v. BlueCross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 44-45 (1st
Cir. 2002).
55. Susan L. Horner, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986:
Its History, Provisions, Applications and Implications, 16 AM. J.L. & MED.
453, 495-96 (1990); Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 19-20; Charity Scott,
Medical Peer Review, Antitrust and the Effect of Statutory Reform, 50 MD. L.
REv. 316, 329-32 (1991).
56. Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1372 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
Limiting privileges to competent doctors is pro-competitive. Weiss v. York
Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 821 n.61 (3d Cir. 1984); Marin v. Citizens Mem'1 Hosp.,
700 F. Supp. 354, 361 (S.D. Tex. 1988); Friedman v. Del. County Mem'1
Hosp., 672 F. Supp. 171, 190 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
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from examining the ability of a physician who engaged in sub-par
treatment of patients to continue to do so. 57 Congress reset the
priorities by putting the rights of patients to treatment by
competent providers as judged by their peers above the rights of
physicians to litigate their ability to compete.
On the other hand, by its express terms, nothing in the
HCQIA affects the application of state peer review statutes to
patient malpractice claims. 58 The HCQIA does not protect the
confidentiality of peer review materials other than those
documents relating to information provided to the National
Practitioner Data Bank.59 It does not support a civil rights cause
57. See, e.g., Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 800 F.2d 119, 122
(7th Cir. 1986) (warning litigants that future antitrust challenges to
credentialing decisions under the Indiana peer review process would be
deemed frivolous); Harron v. United Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 522 F.2d 1133, 1134
(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) ("frivolous to urge that employment of a single
doctor to operate the radiology department of a hospital invokes the Sherman
Act"); Husain v. Helene Fuld Med. Ctr., Civ. No. 89-2107 (AET), 1989 WL
150536, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 8, 1989) ("not every act that causes a person to
suffer a personal or professional set-back can be turned into a Sherman Act
matter").
Professor Scheutzow questions whether physicians' fears regarding lawsuits
for participating in peer review activities were legitimate "because the federal
judiciary has not often entertained lawsuits over staff privileges."
Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 20. The fact that such lawsuits achieved only
limited success does not obviate the burden that they placed on defendants.
See, e.g., Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlinson Mem'l Hosp., 857 F.2d 96, 99 (3d
Cir. 1988) (describing how a dispute involving two doctors at a small hospital
had "raged in state as well as federal courts, trial and appellate"). As the
Supreme Court has since noted, "antitrust discovery can be expensive." Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombley, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1967 (2007). Professor Scheutzow
also does not address all of the credentialing claims that were never litigated
because hospitals did not want to incur the cost. Cf. id.
58. Freilich v. Upper Chesapeake Health, Inc., 313 F.3d 205, 214 (4th
Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11115 (2006)).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1); see also Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259
F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2001) ("Congress will create a medical peer review
privilege when it is so inclined."); Mattice v. Mem'l Hosp., 203 F.R.D. 381, 385
(N.D. Ind. 2001) (in enacting the HCQIA, "Congress . . . has specifically
addressed the issues of confidentiality and protection of the medical peer
review process, but it has chosen not to include a privilege for peer review
materials."); Teasdale v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D. Cal.
1991) ("Congress spoke loudly with its silence in not including a privilege
against discovery of peer review materials in the HCQIA."). But see Cohn v.
Wilkes Gen. Hosp., 127 F.R.D. 117, 121 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (recognizing a
federal privilege), aff'd on other grounds, 953 F.2d 154 (4th Cir. 1991).
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of action for breach of the physician's privacy or the impairment of
confidentiality clauses in medical malpractice settlements. 60
Beyond this effective but limited federal foray under the
HCQIA, peer review has traditionally been a function of state law
pursuant to each state's exercise of its police power.61 The power
granted to physicians to credential other physicians, for example,
goes back to the colonial times.62 States began to formalize the
credentialing process and impose minimum standards by enacting
licensing statutes in the late nineteenth century. 63 These state
statutes set minimum competency standards to be determined by
physicians themselves.64 More recently, states have exercised
their police power to enact peer review statutes. 65 While these
state peer review statutes afford some protection to the
participants in peer review proceedings, the breadth and depth of
that protection in terms of immunity, confidentiality and privilege
60. Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254, 276 (D.N.J. 2003).
61. Developments in the Law-Medical Technology and the Law, 103
HARv. L. REV. 1584, 1599, 1612 n.183 (1990) (state may exercise its police
power to protect public safety and welfare thereby protecting peer review
committee records from disclosure); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 475 (1996) (regulation of health and safety issues has traditionally been
a state function under the police power); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S.
11, 38 (1905) (police power extends to regulation of health care); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 78 (1824) (same).
62. Jonathan P. Tomes, MEDICAL STAFF PRIVILEGES AND PEER REVIEW 10
(1994).
63. See, e.g., Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1888) (states have
the power to regulate entry into a vocation as long as the regulation was not
arbitrary and its purpose was to protect the public welfare); State Bd. of
Health v. Roy, 48 A. 802, 803-04 (R.I. 1901) (medical licensing statute was
valid exercise of the police power and did not violate separation of powers).
64. See Dent, 129 U.S. at 123; see also Hayman v. City of Galveston, 273
U.S. 414, 416 (1927) (public hospital's power to control privileges does not
violate due process); Newton v. Board of Comm'rs, 282 P. 1068, 1070 (Colo.
1929) (same).
65. See, e.g., Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So. 2d 373, 381 (Miss. 1998) (peer
review statute was constitutionally permissible exercise of police power and
did not violate separation of powers); Southwest Cmty. Health Servs. v.
Smith, 755 P.2d 40, 42 (1988). By contrast, courts have generally declined to
create the privilege. See, e.g., Kenney v. Super. Ct., 63 Cal. Rptr. 84, 87 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1967); Shibilski v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 266 N.W.2d 264, 268 (1978);
Nazareth Literary & Benevolent Inst. v. Stephenson, 503 S.W.2d 177, 179
(Ky. 1973). But see Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C.
1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (recognizing the privilege of self-
critical evaluation).
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varies greatly among the states.6 6 This hodgepodge of rules is no
more acceptable than the impact of the antitrust suits that
prompted enactment of the HCQIA.
A. The Importance of Immunity
Immunity is "an exemption from liability or obligation
against" a suit brought by a plaintiff.67  Immunity seeks to
allocate costs for a public good by prohibiting certain types of
suits. For example, society expects judges to make decisions
without fear of personal liability; consequently, judges have
immunity for damage actions no matter how bad their decisions. 68
Since immunity deprives a plaintiff of a potential remedy, it is
typically construed narrowly.6 9
To encourage health care providers to engage in peer review,
Congress and practically every state legislature 70 have enacted
statutes that immunize those persons participating in the peer
review process. 71 These provisions often are invoked by
66. Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 153 (N.D. 1996)
("[A]lthough nearly every state has some form of statutory privilege for
medical peer review, it appears that no two statutes or courts' interpretations
of them, are alike."); see also Nijm, supra note 12, at 542; Susan 0.
Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review
Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 186 (1992-
1993) ("Despite almost universal mention of peer review privilege, there is
extremely wide variation in the privilege granted by the states.").
67. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U.S. 265,
287 (1913).
68. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (judge not
liable for damages for erroneous sterilization decision); Estate of Sherman v.
Almeida, 747 A.2d 470, 475 (R.I. 2000) (judge not liable for damages to
litigant even though judge was convicted of accepting bribes); cf. Pulliam v.
Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 541-42 (1984) (upholding injunctive relief against a
judge).
69. Weissman v. Nat'1 Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1297
(11th Cir. 2007).
70. Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 28. In Florida, the voters have taken
the question out of the hands of legislators and used a referendum to abolish
peer review apparently altogether. See Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster,
984 So. 2d 478, 494 (Fla. 2008); see generally, Laura V. Yaeger, Amendment 7:
Medical Tradition v. The Will of the People: Has Florida's Peer Review
Privilege Vanished?, 13 MICH. ST. U.J. MED & L. 123 (2009).
71. See, e.g., Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007);
Syposs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301, 308 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. 1999); Carr v.
Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1307 (Mass. 1998); cf. Bakare v. Pinnacle Health
Hosps., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 272, 291 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (defamation claim
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defendants when a health care provider's privileges are limited,
denied, or revoked, and the health care provider brings suit.72
They do not create a cause of action for health care providers
challenging how peer review was conducted. 73
The immunity afforded by the HCQIA applies to damage
actions arising under state and federal law.74 It is not a general
immunity and does not extend to other forms of relief.75 As such,
there is no interlocutory appeal from an order denying a motion to
dismiss on the basis of the HCQIA.76 Although the decision that
the HCQIA applies is often made at the time of summary
judgment, it may be deferred until the conclusion of the trial. 77
Under the HCQIA and in many states, this immunity is
qualified; the peer review must have been conducted "(1) in the
reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of quality of
care (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to
the physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to
the physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable
belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such
reasonable effort to obtain facts."78 The rebuttable presumption,
however, is that those participating in peer review activities have
involving statements made by a doctor in an operating room lounge was not
covered by the HCQIA since the claim did not arise out of the peer review
process).
72. Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 27-28 (citing cases).
73. See, e.g., Wayne v. Genesis Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d 1145, 1147-48 (8th
Cir. 1998); Bok v. Mutual Assur., Inc., 119 F.3d 927, 928 (11th Cir. 1997) (per
curiam); Hancock v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Kan., 21 F.3d 373, 374-75
(10th Cir. 1994).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a) (2006).
75. Singh v. BlueCross/Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 44-45 (1st
Cir. 2002); Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 37 F.3d 1026, 1031 (4th
Cir. 1994); Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 883 F. Supp. 1016, 1035 (E.D.
Pa. 1995), aff'd, 87 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 1996).
76. Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1993); Decker v. IHC
Hosp., Inc., 982 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1992).
77. Bryan v. James E. Holmes Reg'I Med. Ctr., 33 F.3d 1318, 1332 (11th
Cir. 1994); Islami v. Covenant Med. Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 1361, 1378 (N.D.
Iowa 1992).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11112(a)(1)-(4); see also Smith v. Our Lady of the Lake
Hosp., Inc., 639 So. 2d 730, 742 (La. 1994) (explaining qualified immunity);
St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 507-08 (Tex. 1997)
(same).
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met those standards. 79 All four standards are objective based on
the totality of circumstances; bad faith, on the other hand, is
immaterial.80
By contrast, in cases outside the medical malpractice context,
courts have interjected other countervailing policy considerations
that effectively limit the value of the peer review process.81 These
considerations have included the "strong public interest in the
prevention and compensation of serious personal injuries caused
by government employees," the "interest in eradicating and
compensating for violations of a person's civil rights," and
ultimately the "need for probative evidence."82
In addition to variations as to when the immunity applies,
different states have different rules as to who can claim the
immunity. In some states the immunity extends to committee
members, the hospitals, and individuals providing information to
the committee so as to defeat negligent credentialing claims, 83
79. 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a); see, e.g., Singh, 308 F.3d at 32-33 (presumption
does not deprive plaintiff of Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial); Bakare
v. Pinnacle Health Hosps., Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 272, 287-90 (M.D. Pa. 2006)
(presumption not rebutted); Austin v. McNamara, 731 F. Supp. 934, 942
(C.D. Cal. 1990) (same), aff'd, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992).
80. Singh, 308 F.3d at 32; Mathews, 87 F.3d at 635; Imperial, 37 F.3d at
1030.
81. See, e.g., Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 268-88 (4th
Cir. 2001) (42 U.S.C. § 1985 (2006)); Marshall v. Spectrum Med. Group, 198
F.R.D. 1, 5 (D. Me. 2000) (ADA); Burrows v. Redbud Cmty. Hosp. Dist., 187
F.R.D. 606, 611 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (EMTALA); United States ex rel. Roberts v.
QHG of Ind., Inc., No. 1:97-CV-174, 1998 WL 1756728, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8,
1998) (False Claims Act); Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 560-61
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Title VII). But see Hadix v. Caruso, No. 4:92-CV-110, 2006
WL 2925270, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 6, 2006) (recognizing peer review
privilege in Eighth Amendment prisoner civil rights claim); Pardo v. Gen.
Hosp. Corp., 841 N.E.2d 692, 701 (Mass. 2006) ("The focus must be on the
committee member's actions within the peer review process itself, not on
possible discriminatory reasons for initiating a review of the plaintiffs
work.").
82. Syposs, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 304 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S.
182, 189 (1990)). But see Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251
(D.D.C. 1970) ("'[Wlhat someone ... at a subsequent date thought of these
acts or omissions is not relevant to the case."' (quoting Richards v. Me. Cent.
R., 21 F.R.D. 590, 592 (D. Me. 1957)), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
83. Compare St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. 952 S.W.2d at 507-09 (HCQIA
defeats negligent credentialing cases) with Kalb v. Morehead, 654 N.E.2d
1039, 701-02 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (Ohio's peer review statute does not
provide hospital with immunity from negligent credentialing claims).
2010] 57
58 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:41
whereas in other states, the immunity is limited.84
As critics are quick to point out, all of these exceptions tend to
protect the rights of physicians, not patients.85 The easy retort to
the criticism is that society has developed a variety of rules that
preclude the use of evidence to further a greater good.86 Thus, not
surprisingly, peer review statutes have withstood equal protection
challenges. 8 7
The existence of immunity for peer review activities has also
been criticized as an unnecessary subsidy for hospitals to protect
them from the damage arising from negligent credentialing
suits. 88 According to these critics, if Congress were to repeal the
HCQIA tomorrow, and all the state legislatures were to follow
suit, hospitals would still have the oft-cited incentive of improving
patient care as an impetus to continuing their peer review
activities. The flaw in that argument is that the cost of those
improvements would increase dramatically, and as the price went
up, less health care would be available. To the extent that
physicians declined to participate in peer review activities,
hospitals could easily rectify that problem by indemnifying them
or procuring insurance. In doing so, the cost of peer review would
be borne by hospitals, not patients.89 Even if that were true,
however, the issue would be whether the total cost to society still
increased. 90
84. Newton, supra note 12, at 730 & nn. 63-64 (comparing states with
statutes that afford broad immunity like California, Maine, and West
Virginia with states where the immunity is limited like Alabama and
Georgia); Nijm, supra note 12, at 549-50 (describing differences among
states); Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 28-29 (same).
85. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 3, at 155; Wilson, supra note 6, at 400.
86. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (exclusion of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (exclusion of information or things obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
87. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (Ill. 1984); Atkins v.
Walker, 445 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
88. Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 25 (citing Greenwood v. Wierdsma, 741
P.2d 1079, 1089 (Wyo. 1987)).
89. Wilson, supra note 6, at 400 n.234; Goldberg, supra note 3, at 155;
Hall, supra note 42, at 265-66.
90. See Melissa Morgan Hawkins, Amendments 7 and 8 Update:
Legislation Enabling the Patient's Right to Know Act and Three Strikes Rule,
25 TRIAL ADvoc. Q. 7, 7-8 (2006) (some "[p]laintiffs' attorneys were using [the
repeal of Florida's peer review privilege by referendum] as a cast-net to fish
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B. The Importance of Confidentiality
Immunity from suit is not the same as a requirement that
peer review materials be kept confidential. 91 Confidentiality is
the obligation to refrain from disclosing information to third
parties.92 It is a prerequisite to the candid communication among
health care providers that peer review requires. 93 Paradoxically,
confidentiality also serves a value by promoting confidence in the
medical system: "Patients are not likely to trust medical staff so
implicitly if they have full knowledge of the mistakes made in the
wards and on the operating tables."94 Consequently, it has been
widely argued that "[c]onfidentiality is essential" to effectuating
improvement in the care and treatment of patients. 95
Confidentiality also protects information as a species of
property. 96 The interest of the plaintiffs' bar in peer review
materials is self-evident, but "other entities such as insurance
companies, the media, consumer groups, and competing health
care providers may also have an interest in peer review
information for various reasons."97 While the ownership of this
for cases"); cf. Mark J. Greenwood, The Physician Profile Database:
Publishing Malpractice Information on the Internet, 21 J. LEGAL MED. 477,
516 (2000) (risk averse doctors will avoid complex procedures to avoid
damage to their reputations). Perhaps the most famous application of the
peer review privilege involved the malpractice case that followed Dr. Denton
Cooley's implantation of the first mechanical heart. See Karp v. Cooley, 493
F.2d 408, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying the Texas privilege).
91. See, e.g., Dir. of Health Affairs Pol'y Planning v. Freedom of Info.
Comm'n., 977 A.2d 148, 158 (Conn. 2009) (credentialing documents at state
university health center were public records and subject to disclosure,
notwithstanding peer review protection).
92. Trinity Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 156 (N.D. 1996)
(quoting Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 66, at 192).
93. Bredice v. Doctor's Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970),
aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Pardo v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., 841
N.E.2d 692, 700 (Mass. 2006); Ex parte Krothapalli, 762 So. 2d 836, 839 (Ala.
2000).
94. Quick, supra note 23, at 36 (quoting Anthony Giddens, THE
CONSEQUENCES OF MODERNITY 86 (1990)).
95. Bredice, 50 F.R.D. at 250.
96. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Corp., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984).
97. Murray G. Sagsveen & Jennifer L. Thompson, The Evolution of
Medical Peer Review in North Dakota, 73 N.D.L. REV. 477, 481-82 (1997); see,
e.g., Public Citizen, Inc. v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 151 F. Supp. 2d
64, 75-77 (D.D.C. 2001) (consumer group); Baltimore Sun Co. v. Univ. of Md.
Med. Sys. Corp., 584 A.2d 683, 685 (Md. 1991) (media).
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property right as between health care providers and patients is
debatable, the putative rights asserted by these third parties are
not.
In the case of peer review, confidentiality actually rectifies
market failure in one sense. Peer review is a collective action
problem; everyone sees the need for it, but there is no incentive for
any individual to address it.98 By affording confidentiality to all
participants, the cost of rectifying this problem to any one
participant is diminished.
On the other hand, confidentiality comes with costs. First, it
distorts the market for health care by limiting the ability of
patients to give their informed consent founded on the duty of a
physician to inform a patient of all the risks. 99 "Trust me, I'm a
doctor," no longer works.oo Notwithstanding their white coats
and stethoscopes, doctors are not all the same. Patients are the
ultimate consumers of health care, 101 and they expect more
information, not less.102 The result of this absence of information
is market failure when it comes to judging the quality of health
care providers.103
98. See Howard Burde, The Implementation of Quality and Safety
Measures: From Rhetoric to Reality, 35 J. HEALTH L. 263, 274 (2002)
("challenge for governments is to limit the cost and potential liability
inherent in the collection and submission of data").
99. See, e.g., Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73,
84-85 (N.J. 2002) (no informed consent if physician objectively
misrepresented credentials); Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (La.
Ct. App. 1991) (surgeon's failure to disclose alcohol abuse defeated informed
consent); Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 498 (Wis. 1996) (no
informed consent where doctor failed to disclose lack of experience). But see
Whiteside v. Lukson, 947 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (lack of
experience not relevant to informed consent determination); Flick, supra note
31, at 1139.
100. See Quick, supra note 23, at 36; see also Treviiio, supra note 34, at
316 (deriding Congress for its paternalistic view that the nation's doctors
"know best").
101. Schloendorf v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E., 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)
(Cardozo, J.). But see Gregory Vistnes, Hospitals, Mergers and Two-Stage
Competition, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 671 (2000) (regulators view health plans
as the relevant customers for antitrust analyses of hospital mergers).
102. See Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of Consumer-
Driven Health Care: Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 2 J. HEALTH &
BIOMEDICAL L. 1, 10 (2006); Quick, supra note 23, at 36.
103. Chiang, supra note 22, at 386 (discussing the practical problem of
creating a market for quality); Mello et al., supra note 7, at 392-93
(consumers do not use quality comparisons in choosing health care
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Second, confidentiality impairs the ex post rights of
patients. 104 Patients want to know what happened to them and
why.105  Moreover, without access to peer review materials,
patients may not even know that they have been wronged.106
Even if they know they have been wronged, their right of access to
the courts, putatively guaranteed by many state constitutions, is
effectively limited. Some states have tried to mitigate these
information problems by coupling peer review statutes with a
requirement that hospitals must self-report certain types of
incidents. 107
Several states have established their own analogs to the
National Practitioner Data Bank, which are accessible to the
public. 108 Further, some states protect the confidentiality of some,
but not all, peer review materials. 109 Still other states cabin peer
review either by case law or statute when the party seeking the
providers).
104. Matchett v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320-21 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974); see also Katherine Mikk, Note, Making the Plaintiff's Bar Earn its
Keep: Rethinking the Hospital Incident Report, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133,
154-55 (2008/2009); Trevifio, supra note 34, at 317.
105. See Hafemeister & Spinos, supra note 11, at 1176; Vogel & Delgado,
supra note 30, at 61 n.55.
106. See Lori Andrews, Studying Medical Error in Situ: Implications for
Malpractice Law and Policy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 362 (2005).
107. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0197 (West 2006 & Supp. 2009); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 5B-5F (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 144.7065
(West 2005 & Supp. 2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-1 (McKinney 2007);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-40(c) (2008); see also Beth Israel Hosp. Assoc. v. Bd. of
Registration in Med., 515 N.E.2d 574, 577-81 (Mass. 1987) (upholding
regulations promulgated pursuant to statutory authority to mandate self-
reporting).
108. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 27 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 5 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 456.041 (West 2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 45:9-22.21 to 22.25 (West 2004 &
Supp. 2009); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAWS § 2995-a (McKinney 2007 & Supp.
2009); see also Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320 F. Supp. 2d 254, 271-75
(D.N.J. 2004) (upholding the constitutionality of New Jersey's statute). See
generally, Jeffrey P. Donohue, Comment, Developing Issues Under the
Massachusetts "Physician Profile" Act, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 115 (1997)
(describing the public accessibility of the Massachusetts Board of
Registration in Medicine Physician Profile database, available at
http://profiles.massmedboard.org/MA-Physician-Profile-Find-Doctor.asp).
109. Compare May v. Wood River Twp. Hosp., 629 N.E.2d 170, 174 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1994) (allowing discovery of incident reports) with Bredice v. Doctors
Hosp., Inc., 51 F.R.D. 187, 188 (D.D.C. 1970) (disallowing the discovery of
incident reports).
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records is a physician challenging a credentialing decision as
opposed to a patient contesting a treatment decision.110 Some
states do not protect the confidentiality of peer review materials at
all.111 At the opposite pole, some states, including Rhode Island,
provide civil or criminal penalties for breaching the confidentiality
of peer review information. 112
If peer review is premised on confidentiality, what happens
when that confidentiality is waived? The notion that a party can
selectively waive a privilege, such as by providing materials to a
regulator but not to third parties, is dubious for it violates the
privilege that it seeks to protect.113
In at least one case, a court held that peer review materials
were admissible because the physician waived the privilege.114
Since one of the purposes of the peer review privilege was to
alleviate the burden on physicians having to testify, the privilege
had no application when a physician testified voluntarily.115 At
the opposite extreme, the plaintiff in another case obtained a copy
of the peer review material yet was unable to use it at trial, even
though the peer review material, a letter, was the basis of his libel
110. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 809.2 (West 2003); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 19a-17b (West 2003); R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37.3-7 (2006); see also
Hayes v. Mercy Health Corp., 739 A.2d 114, 117-18 (Pa. 1999) (construing
statute to permit discovery of peer review proceeding in credentialing
dispute). But see Grande v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., 725 N.E.2d 1083, 1084-86
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (prohibiting the deposition of a peer review participant
in a defamation action where the physician was cleared by the peer review
committee).
111. See Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 58 app. A (collecting states).
112. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-37.3-9(a)-(b) (2004).
113. Every Court of Appeals but one that has considered the issue of
selective waiver has rejected the doctrine. See In re Qwest Comm'cn, Int'l.,
450 F.3d 1179, 1186-94 (10th Cir. 2006); In re Columbia/ HCA Healthcare
Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 304 (6th Cir. 2002); United States
v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997); Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Republic of Phil., 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3d Cir. 1991); In re Martin
Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 1988); In re John Doe Corp.,
675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d
1214, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d
596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (recognizing the doctrine of selective
waiver); cf. In re M & L Bus. Mach. Co., 161 B.R. 689, 696 (D. Colo. 1993);
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F.
Supp. 638, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (recognizing selective waiver with an express
reservation of rights such as a protective order).
114. See W. Covina Hosp. v. Super. Ct., 718 P.2d 124, 119 (Cal. 1986).
115. See id.
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claim. 116 In that case, the privilege apparently adhered to the
committee, not one individual. 117
C. The Importance of Privilege
A requirement that participants in peer review proceedings
are immune from liability or that peer review materials be kept
confidential is not the same as an evidentiary privilege. 118
Ordinarily, a litigant is entitled to any information that is
relevant to her case, even if the information is not admissible but
appears "reasonably calculated" to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. 119 An evidentiary privilege, however, is the
"right not to have another testify as to certain matters as part of a
judicial process." 120 In theory, an evidentiary privilege should not
be an impediment to fact-finding: a "fact is one thing and a
communication concerning that fact is an entirely different
thing."121
The plaintiffs' bar may argue that privileges come with a cost
116. Atkins v. Walker, 445 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
117. Id.; cf. Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 984-85 (R.I. 1986) (speech
and debate privilege accrues to legislature, not individual legislators).
118. Trinity Med. Ctr. v. Holum, 544 N.W.2d 148, 156 (N.D. 1996)
(quoting Scheutzow & Gillis, supra, note 66); see also Johnson v. Nyack
Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 559 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (comparing N.J. STAT. §
2A:84A-22.8 (1994), which protects the confidentiality of information and
data utilized by review committees, with N.Y. EDUc. LAW. § 6527, subd. 3
(2007), which creates a testimonial privilege); Hillsborough County Hosp.
Auth. v. Lopez, 678 So. 2d 408, 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam)
(even though the information was not kept confidential by the hospital, the
records of its peer review committee were privileged); Walker v. Alton Mem'l
Hosp. Ass'n, 414 N.E.2d 850, 852-53 (1981) (prohibition on use in evidence
does not necessarily prevent discovery).
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); see also, e.g., Cunningham v. Cannon, 654
S.E.2d 24, 28 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (information in consent order entered by
the Georgia Board of Medical Examiners was not privileged and relevant
under Rule 26); State ex rel. Dixon v. Darnold, 939 S.W.2d 66, 70 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1997) ("It is not grounds for objection that the information may be
inadmissible at trial, if the information sought appears reasonably calculated
to the discovery of admissible evidence.").
120. Trinity, 544 N.W.2d at 156 (quoting Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note
66, at 192).
121. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981) (quoting
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa.
1962)).
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to the truth-seeking process that outweighs their benefit,122 but
the privileges do not obviate facts.123  In reality, however,
privileges are in derogation of the search for truth, and, therefore,
are disfavored.124 They make fact-finding less accurate, thereby
reducing the rulemaking value of litigation.125
Courts consequently often construe peer review statutes
narrowly.126 Although some states take a functional approach in
ascertaining the parameters of the privilege, others tightly limit
themselves to statutorily defined categories of peer review
122. See, e.g., Jenkins v. DeKalb County, 242 F.R.D. 652, 659 (N.D. Ga.
2007) ("There is little data to suggest that states with more robust privilege
statutes have more peer review."); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210
F.R.D. 597, 608 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (court was not convinced that peer review
process would not function properly in the absence of a federal evidentiary
privilege); Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1081 (R.I. 2006) (court was not
going to "oblige a plaintiff to track down the original source of unprivileged
information that is within the custody of a party to the dispute"). But see
Brathwaite v. State, 623 N.Y.S.2d 228, 230 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (value of
open and candid discussion outweighs inconvenience to litigants).
123. See, e.g., Ex parte Krothapalli, 762 So. 2d 836, 839 (Ala. 2000) (peer
review privilege applies to the committee's self-generated analysis but does
not apply to underlying facts); Babcock v. Bridgeport Hosp., 742 A.2d 322,
342-43 (Conn. 1999) ("The privilege does not apply to those documents that
were independently 'recorded' or 'acquired."'); Munroe Reg'1 Med. Ctr. v.
Rountree, 721 So. 2d 1220, 1223 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] fact witness
may be required to testify as to what he or she saw or heard during a
surgery, but could not be required to testify as to what was told to the peer
review committee.").
124. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710
(1974).
125. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 160 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider
Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of
Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 361 (1981)).
126. See, e.g., Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So. 2d 373, 385 (Miss. 1998);
Trinity, 544 N.W.2d at 155; Menoski v. Shih, 612 N.E.2d 834, 836 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993); Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 857-58 (R.I. 1991). But see Babcock,
742 A.2d at 344 (legislature has determined that value of peer review
outweighs incidental burden on discovery); Pardo v. Gen. Hosp. Corp., 841
N.E.2d 692, 703 (Mass. 2006) ("[P]eer review privilege was enacted to
promote 'the uninhibited expression of professional opinions before a [peer
review committee] and protects the [peer review committee's] work product."')
(quoting Beth Israel Hosp. Ass'n v. Bd. of Registration in Med., 515 N.E.2d
574 (1987))); Mulder v. Vankersen, 637 N.E.2d 1335, 1338 (Ind. Ct. App.
1994) (Indiana court will extend peer review privilege to "all communications
relating to the review of patient care, whether they are formally made in
review proceedings or made in private in such a way as to shape the opinions
of the persons charged with peer review.").
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participants and documents.127 Some courts disregard the
privilege altogether where the plaintiff for good cause "needs" the
information. 128 In at least two states, there is no peer review
privilege in medical malpractice cases at all. 129
II. THE PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE IN RHODE ISLAND
The peer review privilege in Rhode Island is statutorily based
and has been applied by the Rhode Island Supreme Court on three
occasions and by the United States District Court for the District
of Rhode Island once.
A. The Statutory Framework
The Rhode Island peer review privilege governing health care
facilities 13 0 was enacted in 1978 and subsequently amended in
1986.131 It is codified in four places. First, section 5-37-1(11)(i) of
Rhode Island General Laws defines what constitutes a peer review
board.13 2 Second, section 5-37-5.1(27) of Rhode Island General
Laws posits that it is "unprofessional conduct" by failing "to
maintain standards established by peer review boards, including,
but not limited to, standards related to proper utilization of
127. Compare Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1310-11 (Mass. 1998)
(opting for a functional approach to both the identity of the participants in
the peer review process and the information protected) and Marshall v.
Planz, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1258, 1264-67 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (privilege covers a
communication to a peer review committee from a third party) with Trinity,
544 N.W.2d at 153 (privilege only extends to enumerated committees) and
Romero v. Cohen, 679 N.Y.S.2d 264, 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (privilege does
not cover statements made by the defendant to the committee).
128. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-2048 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17
(2007); see also Villano ex rel. Villano v. State, 487 N.Y.S.2d 276, 278 (N.Y.
Ct. Cl. 1985) ("interests of justice significantly outweigh the need for
confidentiality").
129. See Fla. Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478, 494 (Fla.
2008) (upholding the abolition of peer review by voter referendum); Sisters of
Charity Health Sys. v. Raikes, 984 S.W.2d 464, 470 (Ky. 1999) (peer review
statute does not extend to malpractice actions).
130. There are also similar statutory protections for other health care
providers. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 5-29-19, 20 (2004) (podiatrists); id. §§
5-31.1-27, -29 (2004) (dentists); id. § 23-4.1-18 (2008) (operators of
ambulances).
131. See 1978 R.I. Pub. Laws 1046; 1986 R.I. Pub. Laws 631.
132. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-5.1(11)(i) (2004).
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services, use of nonaccepted procedure, and/or quality of care."133
Third, section 5-37.3-7(c) of Rhode Island General Laws provides
in relevant part that "the proceedings and records of medical peer
review boards shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into
evidence."134 Finally, section 23-17-25 of Rhode Island General
Laws contains a similar provision but then proceeds to
denominate a host of exceptions. 135 The peer review privilege in
Rhode Island does not extend to the imposition of any restriction
of privileges or requirement of supervision on a physician; it does
not apply to records "made in the regular course of business by a
hospital," or "[d]ocuments or records otherwise available from
original sources." 136 Of course, "[v]irtually all of the information
considered during the peer review process originates from outside
sources."137
While not a peer review statute, one other provision bears
note. Section 23-17-40 of the Rhode Island General Laws
mandates that hospitals must prepare root cause analyses for
specific denominated events, including, but not limited to, brain
injury, mental impairment, paraplegia, quadriplegia, any type of
paralysis, loss of limb or organ, surgery on the wrong patient,
subjecting a patient to a procedure other than that ordered or
intended by the patient's attending physician and "[a]ny serious or
unforeseen complication, that is not expected or probable,
resulting in an extended hospital stay or death of the patient"
which must be filed with state Department of Health.138
B. State Case Law Interpreting the Peer Review Privilege in
Rhode Island
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has limned the parameters
of the peer review privilege in Rhode Island on three occasions, in
Cofone v. Westerly Hospital 39 in 1986, Moretti v. Lowe' 40 in 1991,
133. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-37-5.1(27) (Supp. 2008).
134. R.I. GEN. LAws § 5-37.3-7(c) (2004).
135. R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-17-25 (2001).
136. Id.
137. Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992).
138. R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-17-40(c)-(d) (2008).
139. 504 A.2d 998 (R.I. 1986).
140. 592 A.2d 855 (R.I. 1991).
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and Pastore v. Samsonl41 in 2006. Even though the peer review
privilege in Rhode Island is statutorily based, the judiciary's
hostility to the peer review privilege is palpable.142 In contrast to
the widely held view that the purpose of peer review is to improve
patient care, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated: "The
peer-review privilege was designed to alleviate an increase in
medical malpractice lawsuits for substandard health care . . . ."143
As such, the peer review "privilege must not be permitted to
become a shield behind which a physician's incompetence,
impairment or institutional malfeasance resulting in medical
malpractice can be hidden from parties who have suffered because
of such incompetence, impairment or malfeasance."144 This harsh
perspective may have made sense at one time, but it does not
today.145
Peer review protection in Rhode Island is thus limited to "only
the records and the proceedings which originate with the peer
review board."146 For example, in Pastore, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court refused to apply the peer review privilege to a
transcript of a peer review board meeting wherein the board
discussed a doctor's bedside manner while working the emergency
room.147 According to the Supreme Court, the "peer review
privilege was designed to alleviate an increase in medical
141. 900 A.2d 1067 (R.I. 2006).
142. The hostility of the Rhode Island Supreme Court to privileges in
general is not unique to the peer review privilege. See, e.g., Gaumond v.
Trinity Repertory Co., 909 A.2d 512, 516-17 (R.I. 2006) (declining to recognize
a "school-disabled student" privilege).
143. Pastore, 900 A.2d at 1079. But see Jenkins v. Wu, 468 N.E.2d 1162,
1168 (111. 1984) ("[T]he purpose of this [Illinois' peer review] legislation is not
to facilitate the prosecution of malpractice cases. Rather, its purpose is to
ensure the effectiveness of professional self-evaluation, by members of the
medical profession, in the interest of improving the quality of health care.").
144. Moretti, 592 A.2d at 857-58.
145. Goldberg, supra note 3, at 158 & n.11 (older peer review statutes
which predate claims for corporate negligence on the part of hospitals were
written to protect doctors) (citing Matchett v. Super. Ct., 115 Cal. Rptr. 317,
321 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974)); see also Dorsten v. Lapeer County Gen. Hosp., 88
F.R.D. 583, 585 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (peer review privilege was "enacted in
apparent response to increased medical malpractice litigation"); Atkins v.
Walker, 445 N.E.2d 1132, 1136 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981) (peer review statute was
directed at malpractice litigation).
146. See Cofone v. Westerly Hosp., 504 A.2d 998, 1000 (R.I. 1986).
147. Pastore, 900 A.2d at 1079.
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malpractice lawsuits for substandard health care, not to reduce
the number of rude or uncompassionate health-care
professionals-although the latter is certainly a commendable
objective."148 If the Supreme Court's rendition of the facts is
taken at its word, then the issue should be relevance; if the
transcript regarding the doctor's bedside manner did not fall
within the peer review privilege, how was his rudeness or lack of
compassion relevant to the patient's malpractice claim?
The Pastore court also turned the "original source" rule on its
head. The request for production at issue was directed to the
hospital.149 Notwithstanding that the document at issue was a
transcript of the hospital's peer review committee, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court upheld the order of production.1so In a
gratuitous remark that is nonetheless the law in Rhode Island,
the Pastore court stated: "[T]o oblige a Plaintiff to track down the
original source of unprivileged information that is within the
custody of the party to the dispute would be to require
burdensome labor for no good reason." 151 Pastore thus potentially
opens up the discussions of every peer review board to second-
guessing.152
In addition, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has taken a
very narrow approach when it comes to limiting the discovery of
the identity of participants in the peer review process. In Moretti,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court required a doctor to answer
interrogatories requesting the names of those who served on a
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1071.
150. Id. at 1080.
151. Id. at 1081; see also Coutu v. Tracy, No. Civ. A. 00-3720, 2004 WL
2821636, at *3 (R.I. Super. Ct. Nov. 10, 2004). Pastore is in direct
contravention of the rule in other states that likens the peer review
committee to a "black hole" - "what goes in cannot come out" by means of
discovery directed to the peer review committee, but the plaintiff can look
elsewhere for the same information. See, e.g., Doe v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of
Am., 891 F. Supp. 607, 610 (N.D. Ga. 1995); see also McGee v. Bruce Hosp.
Sys., 439 S.E.2d 257, 260 (S.C. 1993) ("[T]he public interest in candid
professional peer review should prevail over the litigant's need for
information from the most convenient source.").
152. On the other hand, the Rhode Island Supreme Court could still limit
the damage by denying further discovery into the details of what was said at
the peer review board. See Henry Mayo Newhall Mem'1 Hosp. v. Super. Ct.,
146 Cal. Rptr. 542, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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peer review committee. 153 The rule in Rhode Island ignores the
reality that there is no reason to disclose the name of peer review
participants other than to somehow discover information relevant
to the peer review proceeding, which is supposed to be
privileged.154
It appears that the only area where a Rhode Island court has
favored peer review is in determining whether a particular
committee engages in peer review activities. A justice of the
Superior Court in Cofone held that an "Infection Control
Committee" was a peer review board even though it was not
denominated as such. 155 That finding was not challenged on
appeal,156 however, so its precedential value is limited.
There are other issues arising under the Rhode Island peer
review statute that have not generated a published opinion but
are nonetheless problematic. Not only is the scope of the privilege
limited in Rhode Island, the breadth of the exceptions to the
privilege is wide. For example, the "regular course of business"
carve-out to the peer review privilege is particularly broad and
could arguably sweep up the entire peer review privilege. In
Rhode Island, root cause analyses of a set of denominated
incidents are statutorily mandated and must be filed with the
state Department of Health.157 As such, they are prepared in the
ordinary course of business regardless of whether they are
prepared as part of peer review. Since some courts have held that
153. See Moretti v. Lowe, 592 A.2d 855, 858 (R.I. 1991); Coutu, 2004 WL
2821636, at *3. Massachusetts has adopted the opposite rule. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111 § 204(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (protecting the
identity of participants in the peer review process).
154. See Yuma Reg'I Med. Ctr. v. Super. Ct., 852 P.2d 1256, 1259-60 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1993); see also Kenney v. Super. Ct., 63 Cal. Rptr. 84, 113 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1967) ("Harassment of committee members by subjecting them to
importunement to disclose information received from, or imparted to,
defendant or his attorney would destroy the efficacy, if not the existence, of
these committees.").
155. Cofone v. Westerly Hosp., 504 A.2d 998, 999 (R.I. 1986).
156. See id.; cf. El Gabri v. R.I. Bd. of Med. Licensure & Discipline, No. 97-
4344, 1998 WL 961165, at *13 (R.I. Super. Ct. Dec. 30, 1998) (committee of
the Medical Board was not a peer review board). At least one Massachusetts
court has gone so far as to dispense with the requirement of a committee in
order to protect the confidentiality of a peer review process as opposed to
documents delivered to a particular group of people. See Peters v. Ling, No.
92-0413E, 1994 WL 879535, at *5 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 1, 1994).
157. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-17-40(c), (d) (2008).
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peer review materials prepared in the ordinary course of business
are not subject to the peer review privilege,158 root cause analyses
in the hospital context in Rhode Island arguably fall outside the
peer review privilege.159
This narrow construction of the peer review privilege in the
Rhode Island courts coexists with Rhode Island's unusual version
of Rule 407 of the Rules of Evidence that makes subsequent
remedial measures admissible. 160 Rhode Island's Rule is in direct
contravention to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which precludes
the admission of subsequent remedial measures "on a social policy
of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them
from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety."161 More
importantly, the relevance of subsequent remedial measures is
dubious - the relevant time period is at the time of the accident,
not after. 162
158. See, e.g., State ex rel. AMISUB, Inc. v. Buckley, 618 N.W.2d 684, 695
(Neb. 2000) (incident reports kept in the ordinary course of business not
protected by the peer review privilege); Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. v.
Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 936 P.2d 844, 851 (Nev. 1997) (since occurrence
reports were kept in the ordinary course of business they were discoverable,
not peer review records); Harper v. Cadenhead, 926 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tex.
App. 1995) (credentialing committee's records were kept in the "regular
course of . . . business" and therefore were not protected by the peer review
privilege). But see Carr v. Howard, 689 N.E.2d 1304, 1315 (Mass. 1998)
(incident report was privileged provided it was necessary to peer review
committee work product).
159. See, e.g., Long v. Women & Infants Hosp., No. C.A. PC/03-0589, 2006
WL 2666198, at *2 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2006) (occurrence screen
prepared in the ordinary course of business was not protected by the
attorney-client privilege in a medical malpractice claim).
160. R.I. R. EVID. 407; see, e.g., Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Assocs.,
L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 672 (R.I. 2003) (evidence that defendant subsequently
installed lights was admissible to show negligence). The Rhode Island Rule
is based on Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a). R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory
committee's note. Maine is the only other state with this rule. DAVID P.
LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE, SELECTED RULES OF LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY
146 (2002).
161. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining the social
policy basis for the rule). But see R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note
(disputing this basis); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF
EVIDENCE MANUAL 407-4 to 407-5 (9th ed. 2006).
162. See, e.g., Cook v. McDonough Power Equip., 720 F.2d 829, 831 (5th
Cir. 1983); Rollins v. Bd. of Governors for Higher Educ., 761 F. Supp. 939,
940-41 (D.R.I. 1991) (evidence of repairs that occurred before electrocution
was admissible but evidence of those that occurred after electrocution were
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While the mere preparation of a report is not in and of itself a
remedial measure, 163 the actions described in or taken as a result
of the report are. Production of the report, therefore, is likely to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence unless the report is
covered by the privilege. Given Rhode Island's narrow approach
to peer review coupled with Rhode Island's version of Rule 407,164
there is practically no incentive on the part of health care
providers to engage in the type of rigorous peer review that will
lead to better health care outcomes.
C. Federal Case Law Interpreting the Rhode Island Peer Review
Privilege
In contrast to the crabbed approach taken toward the peer
review privilege in the Rhode Island state courts, the federal court
in Rhode Island has arguably applied the privilege where it should
not in Bennett v. Kent County Memorial Hospital.165 In Bennett,
the plaintiff moved to compel testimony from the director of the
hospital's emergency department.166 The United States District
Court denied the motion, relying on Rhode Island's peer review
privilege.'167
Bennett coupled a state law claim with a cause of action
arising under the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act ("EMTALA").168 In actions arising under federal
law, federal courts look to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.169 Rule 501 sets forth three propositions: (1) in federal
not). The Rhode Island Advisory Committee did not address this, the
stronger, argument. See R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
163. Prentiss & Carlisle Co. v. Koehring-Waterous Div. of Timberjack,
Inc., 972 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1992).
164. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Davol, Inc., C.A. No. 07-5058, 2008 WL 4897928
(R.I. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2008) (refusing to recognize common law privilege of
self-critical analysis in light of the policies behind Rhode Island's version of
Rule 407).
165. 623 F. Supp. 2d 246 (D.R.I. 2009).
166. Id. at 255.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 248.
169. FED. R. EVID. 501; see, e.g., Mem'l Hosp. for McHenry County v.
Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981); United States ex rel. Roberts v.
QHG of Ind., Inc., No. 1:97-CV-174, 1998 WL 1756728, at *1-2 (N.D. Ind. Oct.
8, 1998); Robertson v. Neuromedical Ctr., 169 F.R.D. 80, 81-82 (M.D. La.
1996).
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question cases, federal law generally provides the evidentiary
rule;170 (2) a federal court can recognize a state privilege in the
jurisdictions in which it sits as a matter of comity or by "reason
and experience[;]" 171 and (3) where state law provides the rule of
decision with respect to an element of a claim or a decision, a
federal court can look to a state law privilege.172 A state cannot,
however, mandate that a federal court adhere to state-created
privileges in cases arising under federal law.173
The Bennett court nonetheless applied the privilege.174 In
reaching this conclusion, the Bennett court held that where the
information sought was only relevant to the state law claim, the
assertion of the federal law claim did not void the state law
privilege.175 While the decision in Bennett is consistent with
precedent from at least one other federal court,176 other federal
courts have reached the opposite result in EMTALA cases with
pendent state law claims.177
170. See, e.g., Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007);
Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 293 (4th Cir. 2001); Shadur,
664 F.2d at 1063-64. But see Weekoty v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1343,
1345-46 (D.N.M. 1998) (recognizing a medical peer review privilege in an
action arising under the Federal Torts Claim Act); Brem v. DeCarlo, Lyon,
Hearn & Pazourek, P.A. 162 F.R.D. 94, 102 (D. Md. 1995) (applying
Maryland peer review privilege in defamation action); Komlosi v. N.Y. State
Office of Mental Retardation & Dev. Disabilities, No. 88 Civ. 1792 (JFK),
1992 WL 77544, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1992) (applying policies underlying
New York peer review privilege in federal civil rights act).
171. Jenkins v. DeKalb County, 242 F.R.D. 652, 655 (N.D. Ga. 2007)
(quoting FED. R. EVID. 501); Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145 F.R.D. 683, 688 n.2
(E.D. Cal. 1993) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 501).
172. Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 254-55.
173. Shadur, 664 F.2d at 1061; Pagano, 145 F.R.D. at 688; see also Herron
v. S. Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94-95 (1931) (state constitution cannot dictate the
terms of a jury trial in federal court).
174. See Bennett, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 255.
175. See id.
176. See, e.g., Guzman v. Mem'1 Hermann Hosp. Sys., Civ. A. No. H-07-
3973, 2009 WL 427268, at *7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2009) (applying state peer
review privilege to pendent state law claim).
177. See, e.g., Atteberry v. Longmont United Hosp., 221 F.R.D. 644, 646-47
(D. Colo. 2004) ("[F]ederal law of privilege governs even where the evidence
sought also may be relevant to pendent state law claims."); Burrows v.
Redbud Cmty. Hosp. Dist., 187 F.R.D. 606, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (applying
federal law to pendent state law malpractice claims where state privilege was
"inconsistent with the flexibility of federal privilege law.").
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III. WHAT IS THE PSQIA?
Congress has been cognizant that the importance of collecting
more information to reduce health care errors has been frustrated
by state schemes like those in Rhode Island.178 Consequently, in
2005, Congress revisited the issue of peer review and enacted the
PSQIA.179 In its simplest terms, the PSQIA guarantees
confidentiality and provides a privilege to "patient safety work
product" voluntarily 80  provided to a patient safety
organization.181 According to one of its sponsors, the PSQIA
strikes a balance between a plaintiffs right to information and the
health care community's need to analyze information without fear
of legal sanction. 182 Although the PSQIA affords confidentiality
and privilege protection to patient safety work product provided to
a patient safety organization, it does not protect peer review
materials required to be generated under state law apart from the
PSQIA.
The PSQIA defines "patient safety work product" as:
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), . . . data, reports
records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause
analyses), or written or oral statements-
(i) which-
178. See 150 CONG. REc. S8222, 8222-8223 (daily ed. July 15, 2004)
(statement of Sen. Enzi).
179. Pub. L. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 299b-1 to c-7 (2006)). For an excellent analysis of the PSQIA and
its legislative history, see Kathryn Leaman, Let's Give Them Something to
Talk About: How the PSQIA May Provide Federal Privilege and
Confidentiality Protections to the Medical Peer Review Process, 11 MICH. ST.
U. J. MED. & L. 177 (2007).
180. The voluntary aspect of the PSQIA has its critics: the PSQIA "adds
virtually nothing to the real needs of a proper regulatory approach to medical
errors - it provides no mandate for systematic data collection by providers
nor any reimbursement for it; it does not compel use of data in any kind of
national reporting system, and it fails to make a serious and systematic
attempt to tie performance to solid measurements and reimbursement."
Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: Toward a Federal Model of
Medical Error Reduction, 12 WIDENER L. REV. 1, 18 (2005).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a); see also Leaman, supra note 179, at 192-93
(calling it a "Quid Pro Quo").
182. Leaman, supra note 179, at 188.
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(I) are assembled or developed by a provider for
reporting to a patient safety organization and
are reported to a patient safety organization; or
(II) are developed by a patient safety
organization for the conduct of patient safety
activities;
and which could result in improved patient safety,
health care quality, or health care outcomes; or
(ii) which identify or constitute the deliberations or
analysis of, or identify the fact of reporting pursuant
to, a patient safety evaluation system.183
The PSQIA expressly clarifies that definition, such that:
(i) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not
include a patient's medical record, billing and discharge
information, or any other original patient or provider
record.
(ii) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not
include information that is collected, maintained, or
developed separately, or exists separately, from a patient
safety evaluation system. Such separate information or a
copy thereof reported to a patient safety organization shall
not by reason of its reporting be considered patient safety
work product.
(iii) Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit-
(I) the discovery of or admissibility of information
described in this subparagraph in a criminal, civil, or
administrative proceeding;
(II) the reporting of information described in this
subparagraph to a Federal, State, or local
governmental agency for public health surveillance,
investigation, or other public health purposes or
183. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A).
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health oversight purposes; or
(III) a provider's recordkeeping obligation with
respect to information described in this
subparagraph under Federal, State, or local law.184
A "patient safety organization" is defined in the PSQIA as: "a
private or public entity or component thereof that is listed by the
Secretary pursuant to section 299b-24(d) . . . ."185
The PSQIA provides that "patient safety work product" shall
be privileged and confidential:
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, and subject to subsection (c) . . . , patient safety
work product shall be privileged and shall not be -
(1) subject to a Federal, State, or local civil, criminal,
or administrative subpoena or order, including in a
Federal, State, or local civil or administrative
disciplinary proceeding against a provider;
(2) subject to discovery in connection with a Federal,
State, or local civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding, including in a Federal, State, or local
civil or administrative disciplinary proceeding
against a provider;
(3) subject to disclosure pursuant to section 552 of
title 5, (commonly known as the Freedom of
Information Act) or any other similar Federal, State,
or local law;
(4) admitted as evidence in any Federal, State, or
local governmental civil proceeding, criminal
proceeding, administrative rulemaking proceeding, or
administrative adjudicatory proceeding, including
any such proceeding against a provider; or
(5) admitted in a professional disciplinary
184. Id. § 299b-21(7)(B) (emphasis added).
185. Id. § 299b-21(4).
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proceeding of a professional disciplinary body
established or specifically authorized under State
law.
Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law, and subject to subsection (c) ... , patient safety
work product shall be confidential and shall not be
disclosed.186
Finally, and most significantly, the PSQIA expressly sets
forth certain rules of construction:
Nothing in this section shall be construed-
(1) to limit the application of other Federal, State, or
local laws that provide greater privilege or
confidentiality protections than the privilege and
confidentiality protections provided for in this
section;
(2) to limit, alter, or affect the requirements of
Federal, State, or local law pertaining to information
that is not privileged or confidential under this
section;
(3) except as provided in subsection (i) of this section,
to alter or affect the implementations of any
provision of the HIPAA confidentiality regulations or
section 1320d-5 of this title (or regulations
promulgated under such section);
(4) to limit the authority of any provider, patient
safety organization, or other entity to enter into a
contract requiring greater confidentiality or
delegating authority to make a disclosure or use in
accordance with this section;
186. Id. §§ 299b-22(a), (b). The exceptions in subsection (c) address
criminal proceedings, to enforce the act itself, and where the provider has
authorized release, for example.
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(5) as preempting or otherwise affecting any State
law requiring a provider to repoit information that is
not patient safety work product; or
(6) to limit, alter, or affect any requirement for
reporting to the Food and Drug Administration
information regarding the safety of a product or
activity regulated by the Food and Drug
Administration. 187
On January 11, 2009, the Department of Health and Human
Services promulgated regulations implementing the PSQIA.188
The flaw with the peer review protection in the PSQIA is
buried in the provision that posits that nothing in the PSQIA shall
affect any state reporting requirement regarding information that
is not patient safety work product.189 By definition, "patient
safety work product" does not include "information that is
collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists
separately, from a patient safety evaluation system."190
Information "collected" for state officials such as the root cause
analyses required to be sent to the Rhode Island Department of
Health'91 "exist[s] separately ... from a patient safety evaluation
system."192 Indeed, the legislative history of the PSQIA posits
that information already reported under state statutes like the
New York incident reporting statute is not patient safety work
product because it is not collected or created to report to a patient
safety organization.193 Consequently, these materials fall outside
the definition of patient safety work product and are still not
protected under the PSQIA even though the PSQIA purports to
187. Id. § 299b-22(g) (emphasis added).
188. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 70,732 (Nov.
21, 2008) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2009)).
189. See Mikk, supra note 104, at 143-44 (citing 73 Fed. Reg. 8112, 8123
(proposed Feb. 12, 2008) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 3).
190. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
191. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-17-40(c), (d) (2008).
192. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii).
193. S. Rep. No. 108-196, at 9 (2003); cf. Med. Soc'y of N.J. v. Mottola, 320
F. Supp. 2d 254, 269-71 (D.N.J. 2004) (information submitted to state
Medical Practitioner Review Board was not subject to confidentiality
requirements under HCQIA; nothing in the HCQIA precluded dissemination
of information independently obtained by the state agency).
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protect those very same documents.
One commentator concedes that mandatory reporting to state
and federal organizations falls outside the protection of the PSQIA
but contends that this reporting is already outside the peer review
process because it is made to these agencies by some entity other
than the peer review committee.194  While it is true that
information reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank is
always confidential under the HCQIA,195 her argument that there
is a substantive difference between a report to a patient safety
organization prepared by a peer review committee within a
hospital and a report to the state Department of Health prepared
by Board of Trustees seems to be, in practice, a distinction without
a difference. Both involve the same incident with the same root
cause analysis. To the extent that a hospital is mandated by state
law to send the root cause analysis of the incident to the state,
that report is not patient safety work product under the PSQIA,
and its protection is left to the vagaries of state law. By leaving
this door open, Congress has invited more legal wrangling and
cast another shadow over the efficacy of peer review. 196
IV. WHY THE PSQIA DOES NOT PREEMPT STATE LAW REGULATING
PEER REVIEW
Health care providers may still argue that the PSQIA
preempts state law to the contrary, and that cases like Moretti
and Samson should be consigned to the ash heap so long as the
health care provider submits its peer review materials to a patient
safety organization. These arguments, however, are likely to fail
given the limitation in the pre-emption clause in the PSQIA.
Article VI of the . Constitution, the Supremacy Clause,
provides that federal law preempts state law to the contrary.197
Thus, state law that conflicts with federal law is without effect. 198
194. Leaman, supra note 179, at 192.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 11137(b)(1) (2006); see also Pagano v. Oroville Hosp., 145
F.R.D. 683, 692 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
196. See e.g., Mikk, supra note 104, at 144; Charles M. Key, A Review of
the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 18 HEALTH LAW. 20,
22 (2005).
197. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
198. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 427 (1819)); see, e.g., Prot. & Advocacy for
Persons with Disabilities v. Mental Health & Addiction Servs., 448 F.3d 119,
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Principals of federalism dictate, however, that "'the federal-state
balance' will not be disturbed unintentionally by Congress or
unnecessarily by the courts."199 While Congress can exercise its
powers under Article I of the Constitution to upend state statutes,
the presumption is that Congress generally does not.200
Preemption is particularly disfavored "where federal law is said to
bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation."201
Preemption language involving areas of health and safety,
therefore, is read narrowly. 202
There are three ways that Congress can demonstrate that
intent to preempt state law. First, Congress can explicitly define
the extent to which the enacted statute preempts state law.
Second, federal law can preempt state law when state law actually
conflicts with federal law. Third, state law is preempted if it
attempts to regulate a field that Congress determined should be
occupied exclusively by the federal government. 203  Field
preemption is in actuality merely a species of conflict
preemption. 204
129 (2d Cir. 2006) (Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill Individuals Act,
42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4)(A) [PAMII], preempts Connecticut peer review
statute regarding release of records to protection and advocacy systems for
the mentally ill); Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Missouri Dep't of Mental
Health, 447 F.3d 1021, 1024 (8th Cir. 2006) (to the extent PAMII conflicts
with state law, it preempts Missouri law); Center for Legal Advocacy v.
Hammons, 323 F.3d 1262, 1272 (10th Cir. 2003) (PAMII preempts Colorado
peer review statute); Pa. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Houstoun, 228 F.3d 423,
428 (3d Cir. 2000) (PAMII preempts Pennsylvania peer review statute); see
also Quinn v. Kent Gen'l Hosp., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 1240 n.11 (D. Del. 1985)
(Sherman Act preempts discovery limitation in Delaware peer review
statute). But see Disabilities Rights Ctr., Inc. v. Comm'r, 732 A.2d 1021, 1024
(N.H. 1999) (widely criticized decision that PAMII does not preempt New
Hampshire quality assurance statute).
199. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977) (quoting United
States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)).
200. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1011 (2008) (state
and federal laws can provide parallel damage remedies).
201. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
202. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1976) (citing Cipollone
v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992)).
203. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78-79 (1990).
204. Id. at 79-80 n.5.
2010] 79
80 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 15:41
A. The Express Preemption in the PSQIA Does Not Extend to
State Peer Review Activities
"Congress may pre-empt state authority by so stating in
express terms."205 If Congress includes a preemption clause in a
particular statute, then ordinary principles of statutory
construction apply, and "'there is no need to infer congressional
intent to preempt state laws from the substantive provisions' of
the legislation."206 When the language is explicit, the task is
easy.207
1. Nothing in the Text of the PSQIA Preempts State Laws
Governing the Administration of Peer Review Programs
The explicit use of the phrase, "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of Federal, State or local law" 208 indicates that Congress
intended that the PSQIA trump state law to the contrary when it
comes to the discoverability or admissibility of "patient safety
work product," but it says nothing about information generated
pursuant to any state reporting requirement. 2 09 For example, in
Rhode Island, health care providers are required by statute to file
205. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Develop.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203 (1983). See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2000)
(HIPAA "shall supersede any contrary provision of State law").
206. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 517 (quoting Cal. Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n v.
Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987) (Marshall, J.)).
207. English, 496 U.S. at 79.
208. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(a) (2006).
209. An almost identical provision was incorporated in the Food Security
Act of 1986, 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (2006). Various federal and state courts have
consequently held that the Food Services Act trumps the farm products rule
in the Uniform Commercial Code, UCC § 9-307(1) (2000). See, e.g., In re
McDonald v. Ocilla Cotton Warehouse, Inc., 224 B.R. 862, 866-67 (Bankr.
S.D. Ga. 1998); Tallahatchie County Bank v. Marlow (In re The Julien Co.),
141 Bankr. 384, 388-89 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992); Fin Ag, Inc. v. Hufnagle,
Inc., 720 N.W.2d 579, 582 (Minn. 2006). The preemptive power of the same
phrase in the Food Security Act, however, has been limited to the narrow
subject of the statute. Fin Ag, 720 N.W.2d at 582 ("[S]ection 1631 did not
provide that the buyer would take free of all security interests, but instead
only established a notice system that provided a mechanism for buyers to
protect themselves from some, but not all, security interests."). While the
Food Security Act preempted the farm products rule, it did not, for example,
preempt the UCC's four-month rule for reperfecting security interests in
collateral which is removed to another state. Julien, 141 Bankr. at 389
(referring to legislative history). The preemptive effect of the Food Security
Act on the Uniform Commercial Code, thus, only went so far.
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root cause analyses with the state Department of Health. 210
Pursuant to the familiar principle of expressio unius est exclusio
alterius,2 11 this silence is fatal to any argument that a
"provider"212 could comfortably rely on the PSQIA in any
jurisdiction that mandates the generation of peer review
information.
While it is true that definition of "patient safety work
product" includes "data reports, records, memoranda, [or] analyses
(such as root cause analyses),"213 which seems to be by definition,
peer review information, 214 the "patient safety work product"
must be "reported to a patient safety organization" pursuant to
the PSQIA to qualify as "patient safety work product," not a state
peer review system. 215 Sending the same information collected for
peer review purpose to a patient safety organization does not ipso
facto immunize that information for the purpose of mandatory
state peer review purposes. In fact, the PSQIA expressly states
that information that is "collected, maintained, or developed
separately or exists separately, from a patient safety evaluation
system" that is copied to a patient safety organization "shall not
by reason of its reporting be considered patient safety work
product."216 Thus, it is not possible to secure the protection of the
privilege afforded by the PQSIA for state mandated peer-review
information because state law mandates that it exists
independent of the voluntary requirement of the PSQIA.
This narrow reading of the protection afforded by the
privilege in the PSQIA is consistent with the rules of construction
provided for in the PSQIA. The rules of construction state that
nothing in the PSQIA shall be construed "to limit, alter, or affect
210. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 23-17-40(c), (d) (2008).
211. "A cannon of construction holding that to express or include implies
the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY
265 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
212. The term "provider" includes a "pharmacy ... or health center[,]" as
well as a "physician, physician assistant, nurse practitioner, clinical nurse
specialist, ... pharmacist, or other individual health care practitioner[.]" 42
U.S.C. § 299b-21(8)(A).
213. Id. § 299(b)-21(7)(A).
214. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-17b(d) (West 2003); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-1695(b) (Supp. 2008).
215. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(A)(i)(I).
216. Id. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii).
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the requirements of Federal, State, or local law pertaining to
information that is not privileged or confidential under" the
PSQIA.217 The rules of construction also posit that nothing in the
PSQIA preempts or otherwise affects "any State law requiring a
provider to report information that is not patient safety work
product. "218
By definition, information reported to a state health care
regulator is not patient safety work product when it is "separate
information or a copy thereof." 219 Since information that is
reported to a state health care regulator is not patient safety work
product, it is not afforded the protection of the privilege under the
PSQIA.220
Likewise, the section on limitations of actions in the PSQIA
undermines any argument that the PSQIA preempts state peer
review statutes. That section of the PSQIA expressly provides
that a patient safety organization may not be compelled to
produce information collected or developed under the PSQIA.221
It also provides that "[a]n accrediting body shall not take an
accrediting action against a provider based on the good faith
participation of the provider in the collection, development,
reporting, or maintenance of patient safety work product."222 The
section on limitation of actions in the PSQIA says nothing,
however, about limiting claims by patients.223
In sum, neither the text nor the structure of the PSQIA
217. Id. § 299b-22(g)(2) (2006).
218. Id. § 299b-22(g)(5) (2006).
219. Id. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
220. The Report of the Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor
and Pensions on the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2003, S.
REP. No. 108-196 (2003), the precursor of the PSQIA, explicitly states that
"[i]nformation that must be reported under Federal, State or local reporting
requirements (such as New York's incident reporting statute 10 NYCRR §
405.8)-even when those laws or regulations require the reporting of the
same or similar information regarding the type of events also reported
through the system contemplated by this legislation-is not within the
definition of patient safety data because it is not 'collected or developed ...
for reporting to a patient safety organization . . . . ' Conversely, information
covered under state reporting laws fall outside the definition of patient safety
data because such information is 'collected or developed separately from and
that exists separately from patient safety data . . . . 'Id. at 9.
221. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-22(d)(4)(A)(i).
222. Id. § 299b-22(d)(4)(B).
223. See id. § 299b-22(d)(4).
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suggests that the PSQIA preempts any state reporting
requirement. 224
2. Nothing in the Regulations Implementing the PSQIA Preempts
State Laws Governing the Administration of Peer Review
Programs
Statutes are not the only source of law. Congress may
delegate rulemaking to administrative agencies. 225 The power to
make rules with the force of law extends to the power to preempt
conflicting state requirements. 226 Thus, there are two questions
that must be answered: (1) whether Congress intended to delegate
to the administrative agency the power to make rules preempting
conflicting state statutes, and (2) whether the administrative
agency exercised that power. 227
There is nothing explicit in the PSQIA that authorizes the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to adopt regulations that
preempt state peer review laws. The Secretary has issued
regulations implementing the PSQIA, none of which purports to
preempt state law. 228 In fact, the commentary from the Agency
for Healthcare Research and Quality, Office for Civil Rights,
Department of Health and Human Services, expressly states that
the "fact that information is collected, developed, or analyzed
224. Where the text is clear, the analysis is over. See Pa. Prot. &
Advocacy v. Houstoun, 228 F.3d 423, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2000) (rejecting use of
contrary legislative history where the text was unambiguous). Unlike
Houstoun, where the legislative history seemed at odds with the text of the
statute, the legislative history of the PSQIA and its text are in accord.
During the floor debate on the PQSIA, Congressman Bilirakis, the original
sponsor of the legislation stated: "The bill does not shield other information
outside the patient safety work product from use in court cases." Cong. Rec.
H6673 (July 27, 2005). Similarly, Senator Enzi, the chairman of the Health,
Education, and Pensions Committee stated, "[I]nformation which is currently
available to plaintiffs' attorneys or others will remain available just as it is
today." Cong Rec. S8741 (July 22, 2005); see also Cong. Rec. S8743-44 (July
22, 2005) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("This legislation does nothing to
reduce or affect other Federal, State or local legal requirements pertaining to
health related information.").
225. ICC v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Tex. Pac. R.R. Co., 167 U.S. 479,
494-95 (1897).
226. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009) (collecting authorities).
227. See In re Cajun Elec. Power Co-op., Inc., 109 F.3d 248, 255 (5th Cir.
1997).
228. See 42 C.F.R. pt. 3 (2009).
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under the protections of the Patient Safety Act does not shield a
provider from needing to undertake similar activities, if
applicable, outside the ambit of the statute so that the provider
can meet its obligations with nonpatient safety work product."229
Like the PSQIA itself, the regulations actually exclude from
the definition of patient safety work product information "that is
collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists
separately, from a patient safety evaluation system."230
Information that is gathered for other purposes, even if reported
by way of a copy to the patient safety organization, does not
become patient safety work product by reason of its reporting.231
Information that is not patient safety work product is subject to
discovery and, depending on the jurisdiction, must be reported to
state regulators without the protection of the PSQIA.232
The regulations implementing the PSQIA thus afford
providers no protection from their failure to comply with
mandatory state peer review requirements. To the contrary, "the
original records underlying patient safety work product remain
available in most instances for the providers to meet these other
reporting requirements." 233 A provider, therefore, should not
expect that any information that it voluntarily provides to a
patient safety organization will be inviolate from civil discovery or
inadmissible at trial where provision of the same information is
mandated under state law.
B. Nothing in the PSQIA Suggests that Congress Intended to
Preempt the Field of Peer Review
Given the extremely limited expression of preemption in the
PSQIA, the next question is whether field preemption is present.
Field preemption occurs when Congress impliedly intended to
occupy the field so fully that it "left no room for the States to
supplement it."234 Congress can manifest this intent through (1)
pervasive federal regulation, (2) the presence of a dominant
federal interest, and (3) by evidence that shows that the object
229. 73 Fed. Reg. 70732 (Nov. 21, 2008).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
231. 42 C.F.R. § 3.20 (2006).
232. Id.
233. Id. (emphasis added).
234. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of the
obligations imposed by it reveal a Congressional intent to fully
occupy the field.235 Given that health and safety are traditionally
areas of state concern, courts "will seldom infer, solely from the
comprehensiveness of federal regulations, an intent to pre-empt in
its entirety a field related to health and safety."236
For example, in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Association, the Supreme Court considered a preemption
challenge to Illinois licensing statutes involving the handling of
solid waste to promote job safety.237 While the Illinois statute was
consistent with federal law, Congress had determined that the
Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA") of 1970238 would
occupy the field of workplace safety unless a state expressly
assumed responsibility for all work place safety issues. 239 Illinois
had not taken on those responsibilities. 240 Consequently, its
licensing statutes fell to the field preemption of OSHA.241
Nothing in the PSQIA suggests that Congress intended to
deal with anything other than the discoverability and
admissibility of "patient safety work product," issue as opposed to
protecting all peer review as defined by state law. Consequently,
there is no case to be made that the PSQIA generally preempts
the historically state-driven field of peer review.
C. Nothing in the PSQIA Actually Conflicts with any Peer Review
Statutes
The only issue remaining is whether any of the state peer
review statutes actually conflict with the PSQIA.242 "[A] conflict
will be found . . . where the state 'law stands as an obstacle to the
235. Id.; see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941) (recognizing
field preemption in the area of foreign relations).
236. Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 718
(1985).
237. 505 U.S. 88, 91 (1997).
238. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006) (OSHA).
239. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 97 (1992) (citing
29 U.S.C. § 667(b)).
240. Id.
241. See id. at 103-04.
242. Cf. Prot. & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Mental Health &
Addiction Servs., 448 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (to the extent that PAIMI
and the Connecticut peer review statute actually conflict, PAIMI governs).
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accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress."' 243 A conflict thus exists when it is impossible to
comply with a state law without violating federal law.244
In this case, by definition, there can be no actual conflict
between the PSQIA and any peer review statute, since the
protection afforded by the PSQIA is limited to information sent to
a patient safety organization, not a state agency. The two systems
operate in "parallel."245 Thus, all mandatory state law reporting
obligations remain in full force and effect despite enactment of the
PSQIA. As a result, all peer review materials mandated by those
statutes are not patient safety work product. To the extent that
the respective state laws do not adequately protect peer review
materials, nothing has changed.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
As the foregoing discussion of peer review in Rhode Island,
and the rest of the country amply demonstrate, the law governing
the peer review privilege is in chaos. While the PSQIA was
intended to remedy this problem, it falls short to the extent that
states still mandate the generation of peer review materials
outside patient safety organizations. In the continued absence of
bright-line rules, health care providers are likely to limit peer
review activities, thereby frustrating the use of peer review to
reduce preventable adverse events. 246 Given the inadequacy of
the PSQIA and the need for a better return on America's
investment in health care reform, it is time to recognize a uniform
243. Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982).
244. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153
(1982); see, e.g., Shilling v. Moore, 545 N.W.2d 442, 447 (Neb. 1996) (HCQIA
provides more protection than Nebraska peer review statute).
245. Cf. 151 Cong. Rec. S8744 (2005) (statement of Sen. Jeffords) ("[T]he
legislation before us creates a new, parallel system of information collection
and analysis.").
246. See Chiang, supra note 22, at 405; see also Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383,393 (1981) ("An uncertain privilege, or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the
courts, is little better than no privilege at all."); Irving Healthcare Sys. v.
Brooks, 927 S.W.2d 12, 17 (Tex. 1996) ("Nothing is worse than a half-hearted
privilege; it becomes a game of semantics that leaves parties twisting in the
wind while lawyers determine its scope." (quoting Charles David Creech,
Comment, The Medical Review Committee Privilege: A Jurisdictional Survey,
67 N.C. L. REv. 179, 182 (1988))).
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and predictable peer review privilege. Congress, not the states or
the courts, is in the best position to do so.
A. There Will Not Be a Judicial Solution
The Supreme Court can recognize "by reason and experience"
the existence of a federal common law privilege where such a
privilege has been widely recognized by the states.247 "The Rule
[501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence] . . . did not freeze the law
governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a
particular point in our history, but rather directed federal courts
to 'continue the evolutionary development of testimonial
privileges."' 248 For example, in Jaffee v. Redmond, the Supreme
Court recognized the widespread adoption of a psychotherapist-
patient privilege to invoke the "reason and experience" provision
in Rule 501 to justify the recognition of that privilege. 249 It has
been suggested that following the logic of Jaffee, the Supreme
Court should recognize a federal common law peer review
privilege. 250
The Supreme Court, however, is unlikely to do so. As an
initial matter, the Supreme Court has never viewed privileges
expansively. 251 Moreover, Jaffee militates against the recognition
of a privilege. The "reason and experience" provision is "not a
privilege popularity contest."252  Here, given that state peer
review statutes vary in terms of what is and is not protected, it is
unlikely that a judicial fix is in the offing.253
Jaffee also directs courts to balance a host of other factors.
On one side is whether the privilege furthers a public good, and
whether it is rooted in the imperative need for confidence and
247. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1996) (recognizing federal
privilege for communications between psychoanalysts and patients based on
widespread acceptance at the state level).
248. Id. at 8-9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
249. Id. at 10.
250. Alissa M. Bassler, Comment, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with
States and Recognize a Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHo L. REV. 689,
707-12 (2003).
251. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
252. Jenkins v. DeKalb County, 242 F.R.D. 652, 661 (N.D. Ga. 2007).
253. Syposs v. United States, 63 F. Supp. 2d 301, 308 (W.D.N.Y. 1999);
Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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trust. 254 On the other side is the evidentiary benefit of denying
the privilege. 255 While a peer review privilege furthers a public
good to the extent it fosters medical practices, the plaintiffs' bar
will say that society can reach the same end through damage
awards.
The Supreme Court has yet to weigh these criteria, but in
2001, in Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit considered Jaffee, and declined to recognize a
peer review privilege, albeit in the context of an employment
discrimination case, not a medical malpractice claim. 256 Likewise,
in Adkins v. Christie, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reached the same result in 2007 in another discrimination
suit, again relying on Jaffee.257 In the older decision of Memorial
Hospital for McHenry County v. Shadur, an antitrust case, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit came to the same
conclusion. 258 In all cases, the cause of action arose out of the
peer review process itself, obviating the privilege.259 When these
three decisions are read along with the wave of lower court
decisions, 260 the weight of authority runs heavily against judicial
relief.
254. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-12.
255. Id.
256. 259 F.3d 284, 291; see also Ghazal Sharifi, Comment, Is the Door
Open or Closed? Evaluating the Future of the Federal Medical Peer-Review
Privilege, 42. J. MARSHALL L. REV. 561, 579-80 (2009) (Virmani court adhered
to Jaffee). But see Teresa L. Salamon, When Revoking Privilege Leads to
Invoking Privilege: Whether There Is a Need to Recognize a Clearly Defined
Medical Peer Review Privilege in Virmani v. Novant Health, Inc., 47 VILL. L.
REV. 643, 670 (2002) (Virmani court deviated from Jaffee in failing to follow
state trends).
257. Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007); see also
Sharifi, supra note 256, at 579-80 (Adkins court adhered to Jaffee).
258. 664 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (7th Cir. 1981); see also Sharifi, supra note
256 at 579-80 (Shadur and Jaffee are consistent).
259. Adkins, 488 F.3d at 1329; Virmani, 259 F.3d at 284; Shadur, 664
F.2d at 1062.
260. See, e.g., In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield, 400 F. Supp.
2d 386, 392-93 (D. Mass. 2005); Weiss v. Chester, 231 F.R.D. 202, 206 (E.D.
Pa. 2005); Braswell v. Haywood Reg'l Med. Ctr., 352 F. Supp. 2d 639, 650
(W.D.N.C. 2005); Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan., 220 F.R.D. 633, 645 (D. Kan.
2004); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597, 609 (S.D. Ohio
2002).
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B. There Can and Should Be a Legislative Solution
By contrast, Congress is in a position to fix this problem as
part of its debate on health care. The Constitution affords
Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce as well as the
power to create inferior courts, and the procedural rules governing
them. 261 Since the provision of health care affects a myriad of
interstate interests, and Congress has the power to create
privileges, there is "no doubt concerning the power of Congress to
regulate a peer review process."262 Indeed, the HCQIA was
ostensibly enacted, in large part, in response to the nationwide
problem of incompetent physicians moving from state to state.263
A federal peer review privilege would also reflect the changing
ways by which medicine is practiced. 264 The tort system, with its
focus on specific incidents had utility in the halcyon days when
patients had a single doctor, and most health care was delivered
in the home.265 In the unusual instance that patient did go to the
local hospital, it had charitable immunity from liability.266
Today, the solitary doctor ministering to his patients is
practically gone. Patients are typically treated by teams of health
care providers, "some of whom never actually come in contact with
the patient but whose expertise is nevertheless vital to the
treatment and recovery of patients."267  These health care
providers work in major medical centers that may well do
261. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
262. Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 332 (1991); see also
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 183 (1990) (Congress retains the power
to create evidentiary privileges); Freilich v. Bd. of Dirs., 142 F. Supp. 2d 679,
694-97 (D. Md. 2001), aff'd, 313 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2002) (HCQIA does not
impinge on the Tenth Amendment).
263. H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 2, (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6384, 6385.
264. Furrow, supra note 180, at 34-35.
265. Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as a Substitute for Direct
Government Regulation in Public Health Programs: When Is It Appropriate?,
57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 50 (Autumn 1994).
266. See Freiman, supra note 34, at 723-32 (reviewing the wide
discrepancies in the corporate practice of medicine doctrine among the
southeastern states and the problems created thereby).
267. Mozingo v. Pitt County Mem'l Hosp., 415 S.E.2d 341, 345 (N.C. 1992);
see also Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 690 (Cal. 1944) (recognizing the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur given the multiplicity of actors in the hospital
setting).
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business in more than one jurisdiction. 268 When patients bring
suit, they look to the hospital, not just to the last doctor who saw
them. 269 Accordingly, the law has followed the practice; in many
states, the doctrine of charitable immunity has been widely
abrogated.270
Given this new economic paradigm, a uniform peer review
privilege would lower transaction costs to these health care
providers, thereby reducing, ceteris paribus, the cost of health care
to patients. A federal fix to the peer review problem is not just
permissible; it is necessary.
There is no doubt that, as is the case with all privileges,
adoption of the peer review privilege will come with a price. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has broadly analogized the
peer review privilege to the attorney-client privilege. The fact
that it may suppress the search for the truth 'is the price that
society must pay."' 2 71 Congress, however, has gone out of its way
to limit that price to patients. The definition of "patient safety
work product" expressly excludes "a patient's medical record."272
Given that, in most states, there are penalties for falsifying a
medical record, 273 the plaintiffs' bar still has what it needs to
268. See, e.g., Banner Health Sys. v. Long, 663 N.W.2d 242, 246 (S.D.
2003) (litigation over the departure of an Arizona hospital and nursing home
chain from South Dakota); see also Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, The Corporate
Practice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism in the Modern Health Care
Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 447 (1987) (describing the contemporary
interstate practice of corporate medicine); Mello et al., supra note 7, at 409.
269. See, e.g., Long v. Women & Infants Hosp., No. C.A. PC/03-0589, 2006
WL 2666198, at *1 (R.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 11, 2006); Tucson Med. Ctr. v.
Misevch, 545 P.2d 958, 958 (Ariz. 1976); Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'1
Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (W.V. 1965).
270. See Dallon, supra note 13, at 617; Goldberg, supra note 3, at 162;
Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 25-26; see, e.g., President of Georgetown College
v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Silva v. Providence Hosp., 97
P.2d 798, 802 (Cal. 1939); Parker v. Port Huron Hosp., 105 N.W.2d 1, 14-15
(Mich. 1960).
271. Pardo v. Gen. Hosp. Corp, 841 N.E.2d 692,703 n.27 (Mass. 2006)
(quoting Matter of a John Doe Grand Jury Investigation, 562 N.E.2d 69, 70
(Mass. 1990)).
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(i) (2006).
273. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 230-a (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWs §§ 5-
37-5.1(8), (9) (2004); see also Saunders v. Admin. Review Bd. for Profl Med.
Conduct, 695 N.Y.S.2d 778, 778 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (upholding doctor's
suspension for inadequate recordkeeping).
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prosecute legitimate malpractice claims.274
Admittedly, a federal peer review privilege would be
inconsistent with federalism. Federalism is the doctrine by which
a federal court recognizes and, to the extent possible,
accommodates the sovereignty and legitimate interests of the
state in which the federal court sits.275 However, the court in
Johnson v. Nyack Hospital identified the unreality of this
approach: "[Parties similarly situated in all respects save the
location of the . . . court in which they happen to be litigating
would be faced with a real possibility of different outcomes based
purely on that geographical happenstance."276
A second objection is that a uniform federal rule will stifle
innovation. When Congress does not exercise its power to provide
uniformity, the states cannot serve as laboratories of
innovation. 277  Several states have established their own
statewide patient safety organizations. The present hodgepodge,
however, frustrates the analysis of peer review materials as
health care providers deal with state systems that "often lack
clarity and use different language to describe the reporting
requirements." 278 A uniform privilege will lend itself to a uniform
body of law, which will reduce the cost of collecting peer review
materials and encourage more health care providers to
participate.
A third criticism is that a uniform federal rule simply is not
necessary; health care providers have functioned for years without
a federal privilege and adding one now will not increase the
amount of peer review. 279 The flaw in this argument is that
experience has proved otherwise. Since enactment of the
regulations implementing the PSQIA, numerous patient safety
274. Mikk, supra note 104, at 160-61.
275. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
276. Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 169 F.R.D. 550, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(refusing to "make the parties' access to evidence in resolving a claim under
federal statutes depend upon which bank of the Hudson River the evidence
happens to be located on.").
277. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
278. Furrow, supra note 180, at 29 (citing Joel S. Weissman, et al., Error
Reporting and Disclosure Systems: View from Hospital Leaders, 293 J. AM.
MED. AsS'N 1359, 1362 (2005)).
279. See, e.g., Scheutzow, supra note 27, at 52.
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organizations have been formed.
To trump the assumption that a federal statute can coexist
with "the historic presence of state law," Congress must do so by
demonstrating a "clear and manifest purpose."280 Congress needs
to amend the definition of patient safety work product 281 to
include all peer review materials required to be filed with a state
regulatory agency, not exclude them.
CONCLUSION
The reliable predictability of uniform and effective protection
is essential to unleash aggressive and unrestrained peer review as
part of healthcare reform, to drive quality up and costs down. The
uncertainty of the current state-by-state patchwork quilt has
deterred a nationwide search for best practices, in the name of
enhancing the ability of the individual malpractice plaintiff to
obtain access ex post facto to the relevant incident information.
These priorities need to be reversed. The mechanism to achieve
this critical goal should be incorporated into healthcare reform -
Congress should amend the Patient Safety and Quality
Improvement Act by adding an effective peer review privilege that
unambiguously and effectively eliminates any risk that peer
review information can leak into the tort system. Such an
amendment should make clear that peer review information may
appropriately be accessed by state regulators, without risk of a
waiver of the federal peer review privilege.
280. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1195 (2009).
281. See 42 U.S.C. § 299b-21(7)(B)(ii) (2006).
